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ÖZET 
SENARYO DESTEKLİ RİSKE MARUZ DEĞER UYGULAMALARI 
Riske maruz değer belirli bir hata payıyla finansal kuruluşların maruz kalabileceği 
riskleri ölçmede kullanılan yöntemlerin genel adıdır. Riske maruz değer 
hesaplamaları için literatürde parametrik ve simulasyon bazlı yöntemler 
bulunmaktadır. Bankacılık sektöründe özellikle 2001 yılında yaşanan finansal 
krizlerin etkisiyle riske maruz değer ölçümlerinin ağırlığı gün geçtikçe artmaktadır. 
2001 yılındaki finansal krizler sonucu Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu 
bankalarda riske maruz değer hesaplamalarının yapılmasını zorunlu kılmış ve bu 
tarihten itibaren riske maruz değer hesaplamaları konusunda çalışmalar 
yoğunlaşmıştır.      
Bu çalışmada, Riske Maruz Değer ölçümlerinde sürekli olarak sorun teşkil eden 
kurtosis düzeltmesinin önemli bir yolu olan “Mixture of Normals” düzeltmesi ile 
ilgili bir örnek üzerinde çalışılmıştır. Kurtosis düzeltmesi özellikle Türkiye gibi yeni 
gelişmekte olan piyasalarda büyük önem taşımaktadır. Çünkü piyasalarda oluşan ani 
dalgalanmalar finansal kuruluşlar üzerinde oldukça büyük yıkımlara sebep 
olabilmektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında literatürde bilinen adıyla “Mixture of 
Normals” yaklaşımıyla yapılan kurtosis düzeltmesinin önemi gün geçtikçe 
artmaktadır. Literatürde “Mixture of Normals” yaklaşımından başka kurtosis 
düzeltme teknikleri de bulunmakla birlikte gerek veri ulaşılabilirliği gerek parametrik 
riske maruz değer ölçümlerinde sağladığı kolaylık açısından “Senaryo Destekli Riske 
Maruz Değer” yaklaşımı kullanılmıştır. 
Çalışmada, kullanılan senaryonun seçiminden düzeltmenin parametrik riske maruz 
değer hesaplarına nasıl entegre edilmesi gerektiğine kadar uygulama sürecine ilişkin 
ayrıntılar, parametrik riske maruz değer hesaplamalarının detayları ve etkin bir risk 
yönetimi sürecinin ana parçaları anlatılmıştır. 
 Yapılan düzeltme sonrasında parametrik yaklaşımla karşılaştırıldığında senaryo 
destekli yaklaşımın önemli artılarının olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır.  
 xi
SUMMARY 
SCENARIO SUPPORTED VALUE AT RISK APPLICATIONS 
Value-at-Risk is a general name for measuring financial risks of an institution within 
a given confidence level. In literature several methods like parametric and non-
parametric methods are present in order to calculate Value-at-Risk of an institution. 
Importance of VaR calculations are increasing day by day since financial crisis 
occurred in 2001. VaR calculations are mandatory part of risk management systems 
since 2001 crisis according to BRSA regulations. After that studies related with VaR 
calculations gained importance.   
 
In this study, an example concerning with kurtosis adjusted Value at Risk application 
has been presented. Kurtosis adjustment is a vital part of risk measurement process 
especially in emerging markets such as Turkey. Because sudden changes in market 
conditions may result in financial disasters especially in emerging markets. From this 
point of view importance of normal mixture adjustment is increasing day by day.  In 
the literature there are some other kurtosis adjustment tools present as well. 
However, since the approach’s data reachablity and easiness to combine with 
parametric approaches is present, Scenario supported Value at Risk method is used. 
 
In the study, scenario selection, integration details of normal mixture with parametric 
VaR, parametric VaR calculation details and main components of a financial 
institution’s risk management framework are presented. 
 
After the adjustment, the results are improved significantly with respect to 
parametric approach. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Value at Risk or VaR is a special measure to quantify the risk for financial 
institutions. It tries to measure the market risk of a financial firm’s “book”, which 
means the list of positions in various instruments that expose the firm to financial 
risk. Generally speaking, VaR measures the worst expected loss over a given horizon 
under typical market conditions at a given confidence level.  
VaR calculation models basically say following: “We are c percent certain that we 
will not lose more than V dollars in the next N days” [1]. Here the variable V is the 
VaR of the portfolio. It depends on two parameters: a time period (horizon) N and a 
confidence level c. Therefore when we calculate VaR for a portfolio of a financial 
institution, we calculate the expected loss in the portfolio’s market value over a given 
horizon such as one day or two weeks (N) that is exceeded with a small probability, 
say, 1 percent (1-c). Additionally quality of model directly depends on model 
assumptions.  Assumptions about distribution indicate what the VaR model assumes 
about the distribution of trading revenues profits and losses (P&L).  
Other measures to quantify risk are quantile measures which includes standard 
deviation, interquartile range, and lower partial moments or shortfall measures of the 
financial firm’s portfolio.  
VaR model also says what the model assumes about the distribution of the 
underlying market risk sources which the portfolio’s market value depends on. The 
valuation model states how VaR relates the portfolio’s value to different shocks in 
the market risk sources, or the association between the return of the portfolio and 
returns on the instruments included in the portfolio.  
One important type of VaR methodology is so-called normal approach to VaR. This 
approach assumes that all risk factors in the market are normally distributed and the 
portfolio is a linear function of those normally distributed risks, which means the 
P&L distribution for the portfolio is also normally distributed. Under these 
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assumptions, VaR calculations become easy to solve. VaR turns into a multiple of 
the portfolio standard deviation, where the standard deviation is a linear function of 
individual volatilities and covariances of underlying market risk factors. Therefore 
what is needed to calculate VaR is the variance covariance matrix and information 
about sizes of individual positions to determine the portfolio standard deviation. 
After employing this into the model we have to multiply calculated standard 
deviation by a confidence level parameter and scale variable reflecting the size of the 
portfolio, finally we obtain a VaR number. 
Generally normality assumption gives “normal VaR” great advantages such as 
tractability and easiness. However the worst news may be generally normal approach 
to VaR does not always fit actual financial institutions’ portfolios or actual finance 
data. Because generally financial institutions have nonlinear positions since their 
portfolios have fixed income and option positions. Additionally, normality is a very 
powerful assumption for finance data, since many empirical studies in time series 
data have shown that rate of return of percentage change of many financial variables 
are not normally distributed. 
In order to solve non-linearity problem, risk managers generally use Taylor series 
expansion. The simplest approximation produces the so-called delta-normal 
approach. Delta-normal, by definition, is the first order Taylor series expansion of a 
portfolio’s value with respect to stock returns. Delta-normal sets up the linear 
normality and makes VaR assessment easy. However, such a simple approximation 
produces an inaccurate VaR estimate. Wilson (1996) claims that delta-normal 
approach would make steady estimates for VaR for a small holding period or / and 
when the portfolio has few option positions (close to normality).  
Since Delta-Normal approach cannot give precise answers to problem, in order to get 
a more accurate VaR for non-linear positions (options and fixed income), some 
authors use the quadratic model or the second Taylor series expansion known as 
delta gamma approach.  Some successful studies can be found in the literature which 
says that their delta-gamma approaches improve VaR estimates tremendously 
compared with delta-normal. 
Gamma, the first derivative of delta with respect to stock returns, measures the 
concavity of the relationship between the portfolio value and the underlying market 
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variable. A non-zero gamma implies skewness in the distribution of P&L of the 
portfolio. When gamma is positive (negative), changes in the portfolio are positively 
(negatively) skewed. The normality assumption of risk factors or P&L of the 
portfolio would certainly affect VaR predictions since it depends extensively on the 
distribution of the tail. Thus if we have a thicker (thinner) tail compared with the 
normal distribution, then VaR estimates based on normality would be under (over) 
estimated. 
In literature many studies have shown that VaR calculated under normality 
assumption underestimates risk since the observed distribution of many financial 
return series have tails that are flatter than those implied by conditional normal 
distribution.  
In general, with deviation from normality assumption, there are two major methods 
to build VaR models: parametric approach (analytical approach) and the non-
parametric approach (the simulation approach). In the parametric approach, an 
alternative distribution is explicitly assumed instead of the normal distribution, and 
based on this assumed distribution; a formula to describe the confidence interval is 
logically derived. The variance-covariance approaches that include the distribution of 
portfolio return method, the delta normal valuation method and delta-gamma method 
fall under the parametric approach. In the non-parametric approach, no particular 
distribution assumption is needed. 
Apart from parametric calculations, VaR can be calculated via Monte Carlo 
simulations. In this approach multiple runs have been performed in order to produce 
alternative price movements. 
As in its definition VaR particularly deals with left tail of the distribution. Parametric 
VaR approaches that deviate from normality assumption aim basically at modifying 
for kurtosis. A probability distribution with fat tails has a greater probability mass 
out in the tails of the distribution, where large price movement occurs compared with 
the normal distribution. Accordingly, VaR estimates tend to under- or over- estimate 
risk if normal distribution is assumed. 
Some other researches say that fat tails could come from jumps of underlying risk 
factors. New opinions say that these jumps are significant in explaining the basics of 
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returns. VaR methods try to model kurtosis of underlying risk factors, which may 
have some jumps in the past. 
In order to account for kurtosis in the distribution of underlying risk factors in VaR 
estimates, authors use different methods. One method that is used for modeling tail is 
assuming an alternative distribution for tail of data and deal with thickness of it. 
Some of authors use gamma distributions while others use fixed paretian models for 
modeling P&L of the portfolio.  
Normal mixture or mixture of normals is another method to modeling tails of the 
distribution. Basically normal mixture approach mixes two normal mixtures, which 
are come from two scenarios and gives a generic new distribution. Other types of 
VaR models may employ extreme value theory which is out scope of this study.  
The most important issue in modeling risk may be estimating correct volatility of 
underlying risk factors. Generally VaR models uses normal distributions and this 
assumption generally can not deal with catching volatility jumps, VaR models use 
the widespread estimation methods for estimating volatility including historical 
volatility, ARCH/GARCH volatilities, implied volatility from option pricing, moving 
average volatilities and extreme value theory (EVT).  
In the study of Berkowitz, O’Brien, it can be seen that VaR models depend on 
GARCH estimation for volatility bound actual daily losses in banks’ portfolio closer 
than internal VaR models used by banks [2]. On the other hand, May 2006 and 
March 2003 crisis showed that GARCH and EWMA techniques can not deal with 
this kind of jumps in volatilities. In later chapters these volatility estimation 
techniques are explained. 
1.2 Motivation 
This research is motivated by the last fluctuations that occurred in May 2006. In this 
period general VaR models which are widely used financial sector of Turkey had at 
least 3 hits (Exceptions), meaning every model has failed at least 3 days in this 
period. After stabilization of financial markets, many banks tried to find alternative 
methods to measure their market risks.  
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1.3 The Purpose of the Work 
The main purpose of the thesis is establishing a more adequate and correct trading 
risk measurement approach. This approach must be enough stable with respect to 
daily changes. Additionally, it has to capture sudden changes in market conditions. In 
order to measure risk correctly, model assumes that market risk data has lognormal 
distribution. Additionally in order to capture volatility jumps EWMA method is used. 
1.4 Data 
The data used in the study comes from a small-mid sized commercial bank located in 
Turkey, which have fixed income positions, domestic currency positions and foreign 
exchange positions. In order to deal with VaR methods’ results at least one year time 
period is examined according to BASLE II standards. In their daily uses bank uses 
“1-day” VaRs, at this time bank calculates only price fluctuation risk, and they 
ignore expected returns.  
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2. HISTORY 
Another definition of VaR is a category of probabilistic measures of market risk. 
Assume a portfolio with fixed income elements. At this moment we can know the 
portfolios’ value simply by making market to market to portfolio and that is it. 
However we do not know its future value exactly. Its future value is a random 
variable. Therefore since it is a random variable we can assign a probability 
distribution to variable. As a result VaR metric becomes a function of: 
1. The distribution of portfolio 
2. The portfolio’s current market value. 
With this definition, variance of return, standard deviation of P&L and .99-quantile 
of loss are all VaR metrics. We describe a VaR measure as any process that, given a 
VaR metric, allocates values for that metric to portfolios. 
First VaR measures developed in two parallel lines. The first one was portfolio 
theory, and the other was capital adequacy computations. Here the history of VaR 
measures in the context of portfolio theory is briefly explained and development of 
VaR measures in the context of capital adequacy computations emphasized. 
2.1 The Leavens VaR Measure 
The origins of portfolio theory begin with non-mathematical studies of portfolio 
construction. Some authors have discussed intuitively the merits of diversification. 
Leavens (1945) presented a quantitative case, which may be the first VaR measure 
ever published. 
Leavens supposed a portfolio of ten bonds over some horizon. Each bond would 
either mature at the end of the horizon for USD 1,000 or default or be worthless. 
Default events were assumed as independent. Leavens says that the portfolio’s value 
at the end of the horizon had a binomial distribution. 
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Of course, Leavens did not clearly recognize a VaR metric, but he stated repeatedly 
the “spread between probable losses and gains.” He seems to have had the standard 
deviation of portfolio market value in his mind.  
2.2 The Markowitz and Roy VaR Measures 
Markowitz and Roy (1952) work independent and give similar results to VaR 
literature. Each one was working to develop some significant elements of selecting 
portfolios, meaning finding best components for a portfolio in order to achieve best 
reward. For this purpose, each VaR measures have covariances between risk factors 
in order to reflect hedging and diversification effects. Although the two measures 
look like each other, they support different VaR metrics. Markowitz used a variance 
of simple return metric. Roy used a metric of shortfall risk that represents an upper 
bound on the probability of the portfolio’s gross return being less than some 
specified “catastrophic return” [3]. 
2.3 Early Innovations 
Main aim of early studies done by Markowitz and Roy is finding optimum portfolio 
composition. However Markowitz’s (1959) book is a “how-to” [3] guide to his 
optimization scheme was infeasible since there was not enough processing power to 
compute its complex findings. Markowitz was conscious about this problem and 
proposed a more tractable VaR measure that employed a diagonal covariance matrix.  
Since the processing power of early years is very small VaR calculations was not 
practical. Mainly theoretical results are used and these results based on newly 
emerging portfolio theory. The first applications of VaR well suited especially for 
equity portfolios. In these times there were limited numbers of application areas of 
VaR measures since portfolio range was not as large as today.  
Lietaer (1971) described a practical VaR measure for foreign exchange risk. His 
studies conducted just after establishment of fixed income VaR studies. He made his 
study after World War II when there was a devaluation trend among currencies and 
after firms discover this trend they tried to make hedging operations, and he tries to 
estimate devaluation trends via modeling historical distribution of them. These 
studies generally accepted as first Monte Carlo simulation applications.  
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The 1970s and 1980s come with wide changes for markets and technology. 
Therefore used VaR methodology also changed. At this time following changes in 
VaR methodology occurred. 
 Expanding the types of assets to which VaR might be applied; 
 Changing how organizations took risk; 
 Providing the means to apply VaR in these new contexts. 
When the Bretton Woods agreement collapsed in 1971, exchange rates were 
permitted to float, and an active foreign exchange forward market soon appeared. 
Today, this is the major forward market in the world. 
After that every security market became more volatile. Portfolio returns become 
leveraged and therefore risk levels become higher, As a result of this high risk levels 
regulatory institutions came to play and capital requirement laws are cited.  
2.4 Origins of Regulatory Capital Requirements 
Before 1933 security markets were generally self regulated, however after the year 
1929 some markets including New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has set some 
limitations of its members therefore first regulatory capital requirement established. 
The requirement can be summarized as follows: 
Capital Requirement in order to make transactions in NYSE is equal to: 
 5% of customer debits; 
 A minimum 10% on proprietary holdings in government of municipal bonds; 
 30% on proprietary holdings in other liquid securities;  
 100% on proprietary holdings in all other securities. 
After that market instruments became more complex day by day. Therefore these 
days’ working structure was not enough to meet firm’s requirements. These 
complications were solved via development of computers which have more 
processing power.  
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2.5 Garbade’s VaR Measures 
In the late 1980’s Kenneth Garbade who was working for Bankers Trust Cross 
Markets Research Group developed complicated modeling methods for the US debt 
market. In this study, he prepared a range of study reports for distribution to 
institutional clients. One of these, Garbade (1986, 1987), explained complicated VaR 
measures for assessing internal capital requirements he says: 
“In view of the importance of risk assessment and capital adequacy to regulatory 
agencies and market participants, it is not surprising that many analysts have tried to 
devise procedures for computing risk and/or capital adequacy which are (a) 
comprehensive and (b) simple to implement. Without exception, however, those who 
make the effort quickly discover that the twin goals of breadth and simplicity are 
seemingly impossible to attain simultaneously. As a result, risk and capital adequacy 
formulas are either complex or of limited applicability, and are sometimes both.” [4] 
2.6 The 1988 Basle Accord 
In 1988 G-10 countries has decided to establish a standard for capital requirements.  
These standards are set by Basle Committee on Banking Supervision; the committee 
includes representatives from central banks and regulatory authorities. Over time, the 
focus of the committee has developed, embracing initiatives designed to: 
 Describe roles of regulators in cross-jurisdictional conditions; 
 Guarantee that international banks or bank holding companies do not run off 
 Comprehensive supervision by some “home” regulatory authority; 
 Promote uniform capital requirements so banks from different countries may 
compete with one another on a “level playing field. 
However, G-10 countries decided to regulate their capital requirements via their own 
regulations instead of Basle Accord. VaR calculations are the main part of the Basle 
accord but these calculation procedures generally not clearly defined until 2000’s, 
today another capital requirement is set for financial institutions which generally 
known as BASLE II (BASEL II). 
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3. BASLE II 
After BASLE I or known as Basle accord, many European countries have found that 
daily applications of BASLE I is not suitable for their purposes and they have made a 
second agreement known as BASLE II, in this part we try to explain main 
requirements of BASLE II accord especially from market risk point of view. 
3.1 The risk measurement framework 
As from the end of 1997 or earlier if their supervisory authority wants, banks will be 
required to determine and apply capital charges in respect of their market risks in 
addition to their credit risks. Market risk is defined as the risk of losses in on and off-
balancesheet positions coming from market price movements. The risks subject to 
this requirement are: 
• The risks related to interest rate related instruments and equities in the trading 
book; 
• Foreign exchange risk and commodities risk throughout the bank. 
3.1.1 Scope and coverage of the capital charges 
The capital charges for interest rate related instruments and equities will apply to the 
current mark to market value of items in banks’ trading books. The capital charges 
for foreign exchange risk and for commodities risk will worry to banks’ total 
currency and commodity positions, subject to some caution to leave out structural 
foreign exchange positions. It is understood that some of these positions will be 
reported and hence evaluated at market value. 
Currently, the Committee does not think that it is essential to allow any exceptions 
from the capital requirements for market risk; generally the Basle Capital Framework 
applies only to worldwide working banks, and essentially on a consolidated basis; 
since all of these positions likely to be involved in trading to some extent. 
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Market risk and credit risk are considered as similar risk groups in Basle II accord. 
Consequently as in the same way as for credit risk, the capital requirements for 
market risk should be applied on a worldwide consolidated basis. If possible , 
national authorities may allow banking and financial entities in a group which 
manages a global consolidated book. The capital of these entities is being evaluated 
on a global basis to report short and long positions in exactly the same instrument 
(e.g. currencies, commodities, equities or bonds), on a net basis, regardless of where 
they are booked. 
There will be conditions in which supervisory authorities require that the individual 
positions used in measurement system without any offsetting or netting against 
positions in the remainder of the group. This may be required, for instance, where 
there are problems to the quick repatriation of profits from a foreign subordinate or 
where there are legal and procedural complexities in carrying out the timely 
management of risks on a consolidated basis.  
All national authorities will hold the right to continue to watch the market risks of 
individual entities on a non-consolidated basis to guarantee that significant 
imbalances within a group do not escape supervision. Supervisory authorities will be 
especially cautious in ensuring that banks do not pass positions on reporting dates in 
such a way as to escape measurement. 
3.1.2 Methods of measuring market risks 
In assessing market risks, a choice between two extensive methodologies will be 
allowed, subject to the approval of the national authorities. First alternative will be to 
calculate the risks in a standardized manner, using the measurement frameworks 
described in committee decisions about interest rate, equity position, foreign 
exchange and commodities risk. The capital charge under the standardized 
measurement method will be the measures of risk obtained from this approach 
calculated as summation of each risk factor’s risk 
The alternative method expose to the completion of certain conditions which requires 
the explicit approval of the bank’s supervisory authority. This method permits banks 
to use risk measures resulting from their own internal risk management models, 
subject to seven sets of conditions, they are: 
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• Certain common criteria regarding the sufficiency of the risk management system; 
• Qualitative standards for internal supervision of the use of models, particularly by 
top management; 
• Guidelines for identifying an suitable set of market risk factors (i.e. the market rates 
and prices that affect the worth of banks’ positions); 
• Quantitative standards concerning the use of common minimum statistical 
parameters for measuring risk; 
• Procedures for stress testing; 
• Validation procedures for external oversight of the use of models; 
• Rules for banks which use a combination of models and the standardized approach. 
The standardized methodology uses a “building-block” approach in which specific 
risk and the general market risk coming from debt and equity positions are calculated 
individually. The main aim of internal models is bank’s general trading risk 
exposure, generally leaving specific risk (i.e. exposures to specific issuers of debt 
securities or equities) to be measured principally through separate credit risk 
measurement systems. Model user banks are charged to capital requirements for the 
risk that are not captured by their models. Consequently, a separate capital charge for 
specific risk will be given to each bank using a model to the level that the model does 
not reveal specific risk. 
In calculating the price risk in options under the standardized approach, where a 
number of alternatives with different degrees of complexity are provided, nowadays 
many different types of options are emerged therefore their risk measurement tools 
are also come to play. According to Basle II accord; local supervisory authorities are 
responsible for accuracy of option pricing models. In the longer term, banks which 
are chief traders in options will be expected to move to complex value-at risk 
models. 
Each bank subject to Basle II will be expected to watch and report the level of risk 
against which a capital requirement is to be applied. The bank’s overall minimum 
capital obligation will be: 
(a) The credit risk requirements laid down in the Basle Capital Framework, apart 
from debt and equity securities in the trading book and all positions in commodities, 
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but including the credit counterparty risk on all over-the-counter derivatives whether 
in the trading or the banking books; plus 
(b) Either the capital charges for market risks, summed arithmetically; or 
(c) The measure of market risk derived from the models approach. or 
(d) A mixture of (b) and (c) summed arithmetically. 
All transactions, plus forward sales and purchases, will be included in the calculation 
of capital requirements as from the date on which they were entered into. Although 
usual reporting will in principle take place only at periods (in most countries 
quarterly), banks are expected to control the market risk in their trading book in such 
a way that the capital requirements are being met on a incessant basis, i.e. at the close 
of every business day.  
Local Supervisory authorities have to recognize that banks can “window-dress” their 
positions during the reporting periods and therefore they have to take necessary 
actions in order to see actual positions. Banks will also, of course, be anticipated to 
keep strict risk management systems to assure that intra-day exposures are not 
extreme. If a bank fails to meet the capital requirements, the national authority shall 
ensure that the bank takes immediate measures to correct the situation. 
3.1.3 Transitional arrangements 
Until such time as the national authority wishes to apply the capital charges for 
market risk, the risks from positions enclosed by the market risk package will 
continue to be subject to the present capital charges laid down in the Basle Capital 
Framework. 
Banks will be free to use a combination of the standardized measurement method and 
the internal models approach to calculate their market risks in transition period. As a 
common law, any such “partial” models should cover a whole risk category (e.g. 
interest rate risk or foreign exchange risk), meaning a combination of the two 
methods will not be permitted within the same risk category. However, as most 
banks are currently still implementing or further improving their risk management 
methods, the Committee says that banks should be given - even within risk 
categories - some elasticity in including all their operations on a global basis; this 
elasticity will be subject to endorsement by the national authority and reviewed by 
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the Committee in the future (supervisory authorities will take precautions against 
“cherry-picking” between the standardized approach and the models approach inside 
a risk factor category).  
Banks which implement the modeling alternative for any single risk class will be 
expected over time to incorporate all their operations subject to the exceptions 
mentioned below and to move towards a complete model (i.e. one which confines all 
market risk categories). Banks which implement a model will not be allowed, save in 
exceptional circumstances, to turn back to the standardized approach. In spite of 
these general principles, even banks using complete models to measure their market 
risk may still acquire risks in positions which are not captured by their internal 
trading risk management models, for example, in distant locations, in minor 
currencies or in negligible business areas. Any such risks that are not included in a 
model should be independently measured and reported 
At the present stage, the Committee has not set a deadline for the change to 
comprehensive models even though individual member countries may choose to do 
so. For the moment, banks whose models do not deal with all their market risks will 
be subject to the standardized measurement method for the risks not captured and the 
Committee will watch the situation to avoid probable regulatory arbitrage that may 
arise from using a combination of the standardized and internal models methods. 
Moreover, the supervisory authorities of banks moving towards the models approach 
will wish to be reassured that those banks are gradually improving their risk 
management practices to the extent that they will be in a position to meet all the 
standards once they are applying a fully-fledged model for any risk category [5].  
3.2 The capital requirement 
3.2.1 Definition of capital 
The principal form of suitable capital to cover market risks includes shareholders’ 
equity and retained earnings (tier 1 capital) and supplementary capital (tier 2 capital). 
However, banks may also, at the judgment of their national authority, employ a third 
tier of capital (“tier 3”), consisting of short-term subordinated debt, for the individual 
purpose of meeting a share of the capital requirements for market risks, subject to the 
following conditions:  
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• Banks will be allowed to use tier 3 capital solely to support market risks. This 
means that any capital obligation arising in respect of credit and counterparty risk in 
the terms of the Basle Capital structure, including the credit counterparty risk in 
respect of derivatives in both trading and banking books, needs to be met by the 
current definition of capital in the 1988 Accord (i.e. tiers 1and 2); 
• Tier 3 capital will be restricted to 250% of a bank’s tier 1 capital that is required to 
support market risks. This means that a minimum of about 28½% of market risks 
needs to be supported by tier 1 capital that is not required to support risks in the 
remainder of the book; 
• Tier 2 elements may be replaced for tier 3 up to the same limit of 250% in so far as 
the whole limits in the 1988 Accord are not violated, that is to say qualified tier 2 
capital may not exceed total tier 1 capital, and long-term subordinated debt may not 
exceed 50% of tier 1 capital; 
• Additionally, because the Committee believes that tier 3 capital is only proper to 
meet market risk, a large number of member countries are in favor of retaining the 
rule in the present Accord that tier 1 capital should represent at least half of total 
eligible capital, i.e. that the sum total of tier 2 plus tier 3 capital should not exceed 
total tier 1. On the other hand, the Committee has certain that any decision whether 
or not to apply such a rule should be a matter for national judgment. Some member 
countries may maintain the constraint, excluding in cases where banking activities 
are proportionately very small. Moreover, national authorities will have discretion to 
reject the use of short-term subordinated debt for individual banks or for their 
banking systems generally. 
For short-term subordinated debt to be eligible as tier 3 capital, it needs, if conditions 
demand, to be capable of becoming part of a bank’s permanent capital and thus be 
available to absorb losses in the event of insolvency. It must, therefore, at a 
minimum: 
• be unsecured, subordinated and fully paid up; 
• have an original maturity of at least two years; 
• Not be repayable before the agreed repayment date unless the supervisory authority 
agrees; 
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• Be subject to a lock-in clause which stipulates that neither interest nor principal 
may be paid (even at maturity) if such payment means that the bank falls below or 
remains below its minimum capital requirement. 
3.2.2 Calculation of the capital ratio 
In order to guarantee uniformity in the computation of the capital requirements for 
credit and market risks, a clear numerical link will be formed by multiplying the 
measure of market risk by 12.5 (i.e. the reciprocal of the minimum capital ratio of 
8%) and adding the resulting figure to the sum of risk-weighted assets collected for 
credit risk purposes. The ratio will then be calculated in relation to the sum of the 
two, using as the numerator only eligible capital. 
In calculating eligible capital, it will be essential first to compute the bank’s 
minimum capital requirement for credit risk, and only afterwards its market risk 
requirement, to compute how much tier 1 and tier 2 capital is available to maintain 
market risk. Eligible capital will be the sum of the whole of the bank’s tier 1 capital, 
plus all of its tier 2 capital under the limits compulsory in the 1988 Accord (Basle I). 
Tier 3 capital will be regarded as appropriate only if it can be used to support market 
risks under the specific conditions set in accord. The quoted capital ratio will 
consequently symbolize capital that is available to guarantee both credit risk and 
market risk. Where a bank has tier 3 capital, within the limits set out in accord, which 
is not at hand supporting market risks, it may report that overload as unused but 
eligible tier 3 alongside its standard ratio. 
 
 17 
4. THE STANDARDIZED MEASUREMENT METHOD 
4.1 Interest Rate Risk 
This part explains the standard framework for computing the risk of holding or 
taking positions in debt securities and other interest rate based instruments in the 
trading book. The instruments covered include all fixed-rate and floating-rate debt 
securities and instruments that act like them, as well as non-convertible preference 
shares. Convertible bonds, i.e. debt issues or preference shares that are convertible, at 
a stated price, into common shares of the issuer, will be treated as debt securities. 
The minimum capital requirement is expressed via two individually calculated 
charges, one applying to the “specific risk” of every security, whether it is a short or 
a long position, and the other one is the interest rate risk in the portfolio (termed 
“general market risk”) where long and short positions in different securities or 
instruments can be balanced. 
4.1.1 Specific risk 
The capital charge for specific risk is designed to defend against an adverse progress 
in the price of an individual security owing to factors related to the specific issuer. In 
computing the risk, offsetting will be limited to matched positions in the same issue 
(as well as positions in derivatives). Even if the issuer is the identical, no offsetting 
will be allowable between different issues since differentiations in coupon rates, 
liquidity, call features, etc. mean that prices may deviate in the short run. 
4.1.1.1 Specific risk capital charges for issuer risk 
The specific risk capital charges for “government” and “other” categories will be as 
follows. 
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Table 4.1 Specific Risk Capital Charge Rates 
Categories External credit 
assessment Specific risk capital charge 
Government AAA to AA- 0% 
  
A+ to BBB- 0.25% (residual term to final maturity 6 months or less) 
  
 
1.00% (residual term to final maturity greater than 6 and up 
to and including 24 months) 
  
 1.60% (residual term to final maturity exceeding 24 months) 
  
BB+ to B- 8.00% 
  
Below B- 12.00% 
  
Unrated 8.00% 
Qualifying  0.25% (residual term to final maturity 6 months or less) 
  
 
1.00% (residual term to final maturity greater than 6 and up 
to and including 24 months) 
  
  1.60% (residual term to final maturity exceeding 24 months) 
Other  
Similar to credit risk charges under the standardised approach of the Basle 
II Framework. 
  
BB+ to BB- 8.00% 
  
Below BB- 12.00% 
  
Unrated 8.00% 
   
 
The group “government” will contain all types of government paper including bonds, 
treasury bills and other short-term instruments, but national authorities hold the right 
to apply a specific risk weight to securities issued by particular foreign governments, 
principally to securities denominated in a currency other than that of the issuing 
government. When the government paper is denominated in the domestic currency 
and funded by the bank in the identical currency, at national judgment a lower 
specific risk charge may be applied. 
The “qualifying” category contains securities issued by public sector foundations and 
joint development banks, plus other securities that are: 
• Rated investment-grade by at least two credit rating organizations set by the 
national authority 
• Rated investment-grade by one rating organization and not less than 
investment-grade by any other rating organization specified by the national 
authority 
• Subject to supervisory authorization, unrated, but believed to be of 
comparable investment quality by the reporting bank, and the issuer has 
securities listed on a recognized stock exchange. 
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Each supervisory authority will be responsible for watching the application of these 
qualifying criteria, mostly relative to the last criterion where the first categorization 
is fundamentally left to the reporting banks. National authorities will also have 
judgment to comprise within the qualifying category debt securities issued by banks 
in countries which have employed the Basle Capital Framework. Subject to the state 
understanding that supervisory authorities in such countries carry out prompt 
corrective action if a bank fails to meet the capital standards set forth in the 
Framework. Likewise, national authorities will have judgment to include within the 
qualifying category debt securities issued by securities firms that are subject to 
equivalent rules. 
In addition, the “qualifying” group will contain securities issued by organizations 
that are deemed to be equivalent to investment grade excellence and expose to 
supervisory and regulatory arrangements similar to those under the Basle II 
Framework. 
4.1.1.2 Specific risk rules for unrated debt securities 
Unrated securities may be incorporated in the “qualifying” group when they are 
subject to supervisory approval, unrated, but deemed to be of comparable investment 
quality by the reporting bank, and the issuer has securities listed on a recognized 
stock exchange. This will stay unchanged for banks using the standardized approach. 
For banks using the IRB approach for a portfolio, unrated securities can be 
incorporated in the “qualifying” category if both of the following circumstances are 
present: 
• The securities are rated comparable to investment grade under the reporting 
bank’s internal rating system, which the national supervisor has confirmed 
issuer fulfills with the requirements for an IRB approach; and 
• The issuer has securities listed on a known stock exchange. 
4.1.1.3 Specific risk rules for non-qualifying issuers 
Instruments issued by a non-qualifying issuer will get the same specific risk charge 
as a non-investment grade company borrower under the standardized approach for 
credit risk under the Basle II Framework. 
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However, since this may in certain cases significantly underestimate the specific risk 
for debt instruments which have a high yield to redemption comparative to 
government debt securities, each national supervisor will have the judgment: 
• To pertain a higher specific risk charge to such instruments; and/or 
• To disallow offsetting for the purposes of defining the amount of general 
market risk between such instruments and any other debt instruments. 
From this point of view, securitization exposures that would be subject to a judgment 
treatment under the securitization framework set forth in the Basle II Framework 
(e.g. equity trenches that take in first loss), as well as securitization exposures that 
are unrated liquidity lines or letters of credit should be subject to a capital charge that 
is not smaller than the charge set forth in the securitization framework. 
4.1.1.4 Specific risk capital charges for positions hedged by credit derivatives 
Full allowance will be recognized when the values of two legs (i.e. long and short) 
always move in the reverse direction and generally to the same extent. This would be 
the case in the following situations: 
(a) The two legs consist of totally identical instruments, or 
(b) A long cash position is hedged by a total rate of return swap (or vice versa) and 
there is an exact match between the reference responsibility and the underlying 
exposure 
In these cases, no specific risk capital requirement affects to either sides of the 
position. 
An 80% offset will be recognized when the worth of two legs (i.e. long and short) 
always shifts in the opposite direction but not mostly to the same extent. This would 
be the case when a long cash position is hedged by a credit default swap or a credit 
linked note (or vice versa) and there is an exact match in terms of the reference 
obligation, the maturity of both the reference obligation and the credit derivative, and 
the currency to the underlying exposure. In addition, key aspects of the credit 
derivative contract (e.g. credit event definitions, settlement mechanisms) should not 
cause the price movement of the credit derivative to significantly diverge from the 
price movements of the cash position. To the extent that the transaction transfers risk 
(i.e. taking account of limiting payout provisions such as fixed payouts and 
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materiality thresholds), an 80% specific risk offset will be applied to the side of the 
transaction with the larger capital charge, while the specific risk requirement on the 
other side will be zero. 
Partial allowance will be revealed when the value of the two legs (i.e. long and short) 
usually goes in the reverse way. This would be the case in the next situations: 
(a) If there is an asset difference between the reference obligation and the underlying 
exposure. 
(b) If there is a currency or maturity mismatch between the credit protection and the 
underlying asset.  
(c) If there is an asset mismatch between the cash position and the credit derivative. 
However, the underlying asset is included in the (deliverable) obligations in the 
credit derivative documentation. 
With regard to banks’ first-to-default and second-to-default products in the trading 
book, the fundamental theories developed for the banking book will also apply. 
Banks holding long positions in these products (e.g. buyers of basket credit linked 
notes) would be treated as if they were protection sellers and would be compulsory to 
add the specific risk charges or use the external rating if available. Issuers of these 
notes would be thought as if they were protection buyers and are therefore allowed to 
off-set specific risk for one of the underlying, i.e. the asset with the lowest specific 
risk charge. 
4.1.2 General market risk 
The capital requirements for general market risk are intended to avoid the risk of loss 
arising from changes in market interest rates. A selection between two principal 
techniques of measuring the risk is permitted, a “maturity” method and a “duration” 
method. In each method, the capital charge is the sum of four figures: 
• The net short or long position in the entire trading book; 
• A small proportion of the matched positions in every time interval (the 
“vertical disallowance”); 
• A larger proportion of the matched positions across diverse time intervals (the 
“horizontal disallowance”); 
• A net charge for positions in options, where applicable 
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Separate maturity ladders should be used for every currency and capital charges 
should be computed for each currency individually and then summed with no 
offsetting between positions of opposite sign. In the case of those currencies in which 
business is unimportant, separate maturity ladders for each currency are not 
necessary. Rather, the bank may build a single maturity ladder and slot, within each 
appropriate time interval, the net long or short position for each currency. However, 
these individual net positions are to be summed within each time interval, 
irrespective of whether they are long or short positions, to create a gross position 
figure. 
In the maturity method, long or short positions in debt securities and other sources of 
interest rate exposures including derivative instruments are put into a maturity ladder 
generally comprising thirteen time-bands (or fifteen time-bands in case of low 
coupon instruments). Fixed rate instruments should be placed according to the 
remaining days to maturity and floating-rate instruments according to the remaining 
days to the next repricing date. Reverse positions of the same amount in the same 
issues (but not different issues by the same issuer), whether actual or motional, can 
be skipped from the interest rate maturity framework, as well as closely matched 
swaps, forwards, futures and FRAs. 
The first step in the computation is to weight the positions in all time-bands by a 
factor intended to reflect the price sensitivity of those positions to assumed 
differentiation of interest rates. The weights for each time-band can be seen in Table 
below. Zero-coupon bonds and deep-discount bonds (Bonds with a coupon of less 
than 3%) should be located according to the time-bands set out in the second column 
of the table. 
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Table 4.2 Maturity Method: Time-Bands and Weights 
The next step in the computation is to offset the weighted longs and shorts in each 
time-band; consequently we can reach a single figure in each time band. However, 
each band would contain special instruments and different maturities, a 10% capital 
charge to reflect base risk and gap risk will be charged on the smaller of the 
offsetting positions, and here the direction of position is not important. Thus, if the 
sum of the weighted longs in a time-band is $100 million and the sum of the 
weighted shorts $90 million, the so-called “vertical disallowance” for that timeband 
would be 10% of $90 million (i.e. $9.0 million). 
The result of the above computations is to give two different groups of weighted 
positions, the net long or short positions in each time-band ($10 million long in the 
example above) and the vertical disallowances, which have no sign. Additionally, 
banks will be permitted to perform two rounds of “horizontal offsetting”, first among 
the net positions in each of three zones (zero to one year, one year to four years and 
four years and over), and then between the net positions in the three different zones. 
The offsetting will be subject to amount of disallowances expressed as a fraction of 
the matched positions, as set out in Table below. The weighted long and short 
positions in every one of three zones may be offset, subject to the matched portion 
drawing a disallowance factor that is part of the capital charge. The outstanding net 
position in each zone may be carried over and offset in opposition to opposite 
positions in other zones, subject to a second set of disallowance factors. 
Coupon 3% or 
more 
Coupon less than 
3%  
Risk 
Weight 
Assumed Changes in 
Yield 
1 Month or Less 1 Month or Less 0.00% 1.00 
1 to 3 Months 1 to 3 Months 0.20% 1.00 
3 to 6 Months 3 to 6 Months 0.40% 1.00 
6 to 12 Months 6 to 12 Months 0.70% 1.00 
1 to 2 Years 1 to 1.9 Years 1.25% 0.90 
2 to 3 Years 1.9 to 2.8 Years 1.75% 0.80 
3 to 4 Years 2.8 to 3.6 Years 2.25% 0.75 
4 to 5 Years 3.6 to 4.3 Years 2.75% 0.75 
5 to 7 Years 4.3 to 5.7 Years 3.25% 0.70 
7 to 10 Years 5.7 to 7.3 Years 3.75% 0.65 
10 to 15 Years 7.3 to 9.3 Years 4.50% 0.60 
15 to 20 Years 9.3 to 10.6 Years 5.25% 0.60 
Over 20 Years 10.6 to 12 Years 6.00% 0.60 
  12 to 20 Years 8.00% 0.60 
  Over 20 Years 12.50% 0.60 
 24 
Table 4.3 Horizontal Disallowances 
Zones Time-Band Within the 
zone 
Between 
Adjacent 
Zones 
Between Adjacent 
Zones 1 and 3 
  1 Month or Less       
Zone 1 1 to 3 Months 40%     
  3 to 6 Months       
  6 to 12 Months   40%   
  1 to 2 Years       
Zone 2 2 to 3 Years 30%   100% 
  3 to 4 Years       
  4 to 5 Years   40%   
  5 to 7 Years       
Zone 3 7 to 10 Years 30%     
  10 to 15 Years       
  15 to 20 Years       
  Over 20 Years       
Under the substitute duration method, banks with the required ability may, with their 
supervisors’ permission, use a more accurate method of measuring all of their 
general market risk by calculating the price sensitivity of each position individually. 
Banks must choose and use the method on a constant basis (unless a change in 
method is accepted by the national authority) and will be subject to supervisory 
watch of the systems used. The mechanics of this method are as follows: 
• First compute the price sensitivity of every product in terms of a change in 
interest rates of between 0.6 and 1.0 percentage points depending on the 
remaining days to  maturity of the instrument 
• Put the resulting sensitivity measures into a duration-based ladder with the 
fifteen time-bands 
• Subject long and short positions in each time-band to a 5% vertical 
disallowance designed to capture basis risk 
• Carry forward the net positions in each time-band for horizontal offsetting 
subject to the disallowances 
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Table 4.4 Duration Method: Time-Bands and assumed changes in yield 
  
Assumed Annual 
Change in yield   
Assumed Annual 
Change in yield 
Zone 1   Zone 3   
1 Month or Less 1.00 3.6 to 4.3 Years 0.75 
1 to 3 Months 1.00 4.3 to 5.7 Years 0.70 
3 to 6 Months 1.00 5.7 to 7.3 Years 0.65 
6 to 12 Months 1.00 7.3 to 9.3 Years 0.60 
  
  9.3 to 10.6 Years 0.60 
Zone 2   10.6 to 12 Years 0.60 
1 to 1.9 Years 0.90 12 to 20 Years 0.60 
1.9 to 2.8 Years 0.80 Over 20 Years 0.60 
2.8 to 3.6 Years 0.75     
In the case of remaining currencies the gross positions in each time-band will be 
subject to related risk weights which are shown in tables above either but if positions 
are reported using the duration method, with no further offsets. 
4.1.3 Interest rate derivatives 
The measurement system should contain all interest rate derivatives and off balance- 
sheet instruments in the trading book which respond to changes in interest rates, (e.g. 
forward rate agreements (FRAs), other forward contracts, bond futures, interest rate 
and cross-currency swaps and forward foreign exchange positions). Options can be 
dealt with many different ways.  
4.1.3.1 Calculation of positions 
The derivatives should be converted into positions in the appropriate underlying and 
become subject to specific and general market risk charges as described above. In 
order to compute the standard formula described above, the amounts reported should 
be the market value of the principal amount of the underlying or of the notional 
underlying. 
Futures and forward contracts, including FRAs 
These instruments are assumed as a combination of a long and a short position in a 
government security. The maturity of a future or a FRA will be the era until delivery 
or use of the contract, plus - where applicable - the maturity of the underlying 
instrument. For instance, a long position in a May three month interest rate future 
(taken in March) is to be reported as a long position in a government security with a 
maturity of five months and a short position in a government security with a maturity 
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of two months. Where wide range of deliverable instruments may be delivered to 
fulfill the contract, the bank has ability to select which deliverable security goes into 
the maturity or duration ladder but should consider any conversion factor defined by 
the exchange. In the case of a future on a corporate bond index, positions will be 
incorporated at the market value of the notional underlying portfolio of securities. 
Swaps 
Swaps will be considered as two notional positions in government securities with 
relevant maturities. For instance, an interest rate swap which a bank is getting 
floating interest rate and giving fixed will be treated as a long position in a floating 
rate instrument of maturity equal to the period until the next interest fixing and a 
short position in a fixed-rate instrument of maturity equal to the remaining life of the 
swap. For swaps that give or get a fixed or floating interest rate against some other 
reference price, e.g. a stock index, the interest rate part should be put into the suitable 
repricing maturity class, with the equity component being incorporated in the equity 
structure. The separate legs of cross-currency swaps are to be reported in the related 
maturity ladders for the currencies concerned. 
4.1.3.2 Calculation of capital charges for derivatives under the standardized 
methodology 
Allowable offsetting of matched positions 
Banks may not include the interest rate maturity framework altogether (for both 
specific and general market risk) long and short positions (both actual and notional) 
in the same instruments with precisely the same issuer, coupon, currency and 
maturity. A matched position in a future or forward and its corresponding underlying 
may also be completely offset, and thus not included in computation. When the 
future or the forward includes a range of deliverable instruments offsetting of 
positions in the future or forward contract and its underlying is only allowable in 
cases where there is a readily identifiable underlying security which is most 
profitable for the trader with a short position to send. The worth of this security, 
sometimes called the “cheapest-to-deliver”, and the price of the future or forward 
contract should in such cases move in close alignment. No offsetting will be 
permitted between positions in different currencies; the separate legs of cross-
currency swaps or forward foreign exchange deals are to be treated as notional 
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positions in the relevant instruments and included in the appropriate computation for 
each currency. 
Additionally, reverse positions in the identical category of instruments can indefinite 
conditions are regarded as matched and permitted to offset entirely. To meet the 
requirements for this treatment the positions must tell to the same underlying 
instruments, be of the same nominal value and be denominated in the same currency. 
In addition: 
(i) For futures: If a netting operation is done on two different underlyings, 
maturities of these underlyings should be within seven days.  
(ii) For swaps and FRAs: the reference price (for floating rate positions) must be 
identical and the coupon closely matched (i.e. in 15 basis points); and 
(iii) For swaps, FRAs and forwards: the next interest fixing date or, for fixed 
coupon positions or forwards, the remaining maturity must stay within the following 
limits: 
• Less than one month hence: same day; 
• Between one month and one year hence: within seven days; 
• Over one year hence: within thirty days. 
Banks with big swap books may use another formula for these swaps to compute the 
positions to be incorporated in the maturity or duration ladder. One technique would 
be to first translate the payments required by the swap into their current values. For 
that purpose, each payment should be discounted using corresponding yields, and a 
single net number for the present value of the cash flows entered into the suitable 
time-band using procedures that apply to zero (or low) coupon bonds; these numbers 
should be slotted into the general market risk framework as defined earlier. A 
substitute method would be to compute the sensitivity of the net present value 
implied by the change in yield used in the maturity or duration method and distribute 
these sensitivities into the time-bands set out in table above. Additional methods 
which create similar results could also be used. Such substitute actions will, however, 
only be permitted if: 
• The supervisory authority is completely satisfied with the accurateness of the 
systems being used; 
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• The positions calculated completely reflect the sensitivity of the cash flows to 
interest rate changes and are entered into the suitable time-bands; 
• The positions are denominated in the same currency. 
Specific risk 
Interest rate and currency swaps, FRAs, forward foreign exchange contracts and 
interest rate futures will not be expose to a specific risk charge. This exception also 
applies to futures on an interest rate index (e.g. LIBOR). On the other hand, in the 
case of futures contracts where the underlying is a debt security, or an index 
representing a basket of debt securities, a specific risk charge will pertain according 
to the credit risk of the issuer. 
General market risk 
General market risk applies to positions in every derivative product in the similar 
way as for cash positions, subject only to an exception for fully or very closely 
matched positions in identical instruments. The different categories of instruments 
should be slotted into the maturity ladder and treated along with the rules identified 
earlier. 
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Table 4.5 Summary of treatment of interest rate derivatives 
Instrument Specific risk Charge General market risk charge 
Exchange-traded future     
- Government debt security No Yes, as two positions 
- Corporate debt security Yes Yes, as two positions 
- Index on interest rates  No Yes, as two positions 
OTC forward     
- Government debt security No Yes, as two positions 
- Corporate debt security Yes Yes, as two positions 
- Index on interest rates  No Yes, as two positions 
FRAs, Swaps No Yes, as two positions 
Forward foreign exchange No Yes, as one position in each currency 
Options   Either 
- Government debt security No a) Carve out together with the 
    associated hedging positions 
    - simplified approach 
    - scenario analysis 
    - internal models (Part B) 
- Corporate debt security Yes b) General market risk charge 
- Index on interest rates No according to the delta-plus 
- FRAs, Swaps No method (gamma and vega should 
    receive separate capital charges) 
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4.2 Equity Position Risk 
This section defines a minimum capital standard to cover the risk of holding or 
taking positions in equities in the trading book. It concerns to long and short 
positions in all instruments that display market behavior similar to equities, but not to 
non-convertible preference shares. Long and short positions in the same subject may 
be reported on a net basis. The instruments covered contain common stocks, whether 
voting or non-voting, adaptable securities that act like equities and commitments to 
buy or sell equity securities. The treatment of derivative products, stock indices and 
index arbitrage is described in following sections. 
4.2.1 Specific and general market risk 
As with debt securities, the minimum capital standard for equities is represented in 
terms of two independently calculated charges for the “specific risk” of having a long 
or short position in an individual equity and for the “general market risk” of having a 
long or short position in the market as a whole. Specific risk is defined as the bank’s 
total equity positions (i.e. the sum of all long equity positions and of all short equity 
positions) and general market risk as the difference between the sum of the longs and 
the sum of the shorts (meaning. the overall net position in an equity market).The long 
or short position in the market must be calculated on a market-by-market basis, i.e. 
for every different market calculations should be different. 
The capital charge for specific risk is equal to 8%, except the portfolio is both liquid 
and well-diversified; in this case the charge will be 4%. Given the special 
characteristics of national markets in terms of marketability and concentration, public 
authorities will have right to set the criteria for liquid and diversified portfolios. The 
general market risk charge will be 8%. 
4.2.2 Equity derivatives 
Except for options, equity derivatives and off-balancesheet positions which are 
driven by changes in equity prices should be incorporated in the measurement 
system. This contains futures and swaps on both individual equities and on stock 
indices. The derivatives are to be transformed into positions in the relevant 
underlying. 
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4.2.2.1 Calculation of positions 
In order to compute the standard formula for specific and general market risk, 
positions in derivatives should be transformed into notional equity positions:  
• Futures and forward contracts involving to individual equities should be reported at 
current market prices; 
• Futures relating to stock indices should be reported as the marked-to-market value 
of the notional underlying equity portfolio; 
• Equity swaps have to be considered as two notional positions; 
• Equity options and stock index options should be either “carved out” together with 
the associated underlyings or be incorporated in the measure of general market risk 
described in this section according to the delta-plus method. 
4.2.2.2 Calculation of capital charges 
Measurement of specific and general market risk 
Matched positions in each matching equity or stock index in each market may be 
completely offset, resulting in a single net short or long position to which the specific 
and general market risk charges will concern. For example, a future in a given equity 
may be offset against a reverse cash position in the identical equity 
Risk in relation to an index 
In addition to general market risk, an additional capital charge of 2% will apply to 
the net long or short position in an index contract comprising a diversified portfolio 
of equities. This capital charge is proposed to wrap factors such as implementation 
risk. Public supervisory authorities will take care to ensure that this 2% risk weight 
concerns only to well-diversified indices. 
Arbitrage 
If bank has arbitrages related with the futures, via related arbitrage strategies 
described below, the extra 2% capital charge described above may be applied to only 
one index with the opposite position except from a capital charge. The strategies are: 
• When the bank takes a reverse position in definitely the same index at different 
dates or in different market centers 
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• When the bank has a reverse position in contracts at the same date in different but 
similar indices, subject to supervisory oversight that the two indices contain adequate 
common components to validate offsetting. 
Where a bank employs in a planned arbitrage strategy, in which a futures contract on 
a broadly-based index matches a basket of stocks, it will be permissible to carve out 
both positions from the standardized methodology on condition that: 
• The trade has been consciously entered into and separately controlled; 
• The composition of the basket of stocks represents at least 90% of the index when 
broken down into its notional components. 
In such a case the smallest capital requirement will be 4% (i.e. 2% of the gross value 
of the positions on each side) to reflect difference and implementation risks. This 
applies even if all of the stocks including the index are held in the same proportions. 
Any excess value of the stocks including the basket over the value of the futures 
contract or excess value of the futures contract over the value of the basket is to be 
treated as an open long or short position. If a bank takes a position in stock receipts 
against an opposite position in the underlying equity or identical equities in different 
markets, it may match the position (i.e. bear no capital charge) but only on condition 
that any costs on change are fully taken into account. 
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Table 4.6 Summary of Treatment of Equity Derivatives 
Instrument Spesific Risk General Market Risk 
Exchange-traded or OTC Future     
Individual Equity Yes Yes, as underlying 
Index 2% Yes, as underlying 
Options     
Individual Equity Yes Either 
    
(a) Carve out together with the 
associated hedging positions 
    - simplified approach 
    - scenario analysis 
    - internal models 
Index 2% (b) General market risk charge 
according to the delta-plus method 
(gamma and 
vega should receive separate capital 
charges) 
4.3 Foreign Exchange Risk 
This section specifies a minimum capital standard to wrap the risk of holding or 
taking positions in foreign currencies, as well as gold. 
Two procedures are needed to compute the capital requirement for foreign exchange 
risk. The first one is to determine the exposure in a single currency position. The 
second one is to measure the risks inherent in a bank’s mix of long and short 
positions in different currencies. 
 
 
 34 
4.3.1 Measuring the exposure in a single currency 
The bank’s net open position in every currency should be calculated by summing: 
• The net spot position (i.e. all assets minus all liability items, including accrued 
interest, denominated in the currency in question); 
• The net forward position (i.e. all amounts will be received less all amounts to be 
paid under forward foreign exchange transactions, counting currency futures and the 
principal on currency swaps not included in the spot position); 
• Guarantees (and similar instruments) that are convinced to be called and are likely 
to be canceled; 
• Net future income/expenses not yet accrued but already entirely hedged (at the 
judgment of the reporting bank); 
• Depending on particular accounting conventions in different countries, any other 
item representing a profit or loss in foreign currencies; 
• The net delta equivalent of whole foreign currency options. 
Positions in merged currencies require to be independently reported but, for 
computing banks’ open positions, may be either treated as a currency in their 
individual right or split into their component parts on a steady basis. Positions in gold 
should be measured in the same way. 
Three aspects require more specific comment: the treatment of interest, other income 
and expenses; the measurement of forward currency positions and gold; and the 
treatment of “structural” positions. 
4.3.1.1 The treatment of interest, other income and expenses 
Interest accumulated (i.e. earned but not yet received) should be incorporated as a 
position. Accrued expenditures should be included as well. Unearned but expected 
future interest and predictable expenses may be excluded unless the amounts are 
certain and banks have taken the opportunity to hedge them. If banks incorporate 
future income/expenses they should do so on steady basis, and not be permitted to 
choose only those expected future flows which decrease their position. 
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4.3.1.2 The measurement of forward currency and gold positions 
Forward currency and gold positions will generally be priced at present spot market 
exchange rates. Using forward exchange rates would be unsuitable since it would 
result in the measured positions reflecting present interest rate gaps to some extent. 
However, banks which base their normal management accounting on net present 
values are expected to use the net present values of each position, discounted using 
current interest rates and valued at current spot rates, for measuring their forward 
currency and gold positions. 
4.3.1.3 The treatment of structural positions 
A matched currency position will defend a bank against loss from fluctuations in 
exchange rates, but will not essentially defend its capital adequacy ratio. If a bank 
has its capital denominated in its domestic currency and has a collection of foreign 
currency assets and liabilities that is totally matched, its capital/asset ratio will drop 
if the domestic currency devalues. By running a short position in the domestic 
currency the bank can defend its capital adequacy ratio, although the position would 
result a loss if the domestic currency were to realize. 
Supervisory authorities are free to let banks to defend their capital adequacy ratio in 
this way. Thus, any positions which a bank has intentionally taken in order to hedge 
partly or completely against the undesirable effect of the exchange rate on its capital 
ratio may be excluded from the calculation of net open currency positions, subject to 
all of the following conditions being met: 
• Such positions require being of a “structural”, i.e. of non-dealing, nature (the 
precise meaning to be set by national authorities according to national accounting 
standards and practices); 
• The national authority needs to be satisfied that the “structural” position excluded 
does no more than keep the bank’s capital adequacy ratio; 
• Any prohibiting of the position needs to be applied constantly, with the treatment of 
the hedge remaining the same for the life of the assets or other items. 
No capital charge need effect to positions related to items that are subtracted from a 
bank’s capital when calculating its capital base, such as investments neither in non-
consolidated subordinates, nor to other long-term participations denominated in 
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foreign currencies which are reported in the published accounts at historic cost. 
These may also be treated as structural positions. 
4.3.2 Measuring the foreign exchange risk in a portfolio of foreign currency 
positions and gold 
Banks will have an alternative between two substitute measures at supervisory 
judgment; a “shorthand” method which assumes all currencies equally; and the 
employment of internal models which takes account of the real degree of risk 
dependent on the composition of the bank’s portfolio. 
Under the shorthand method, the nominal amount (or net present value) of the net 
position in each foreign currency and in gold is transformed at spot rates into the 
reporting currency. The general net open position is calculated by total:  
• The sum of the net short positions or the sum of the net long positions, whichever is 
the greater; plus 
• The net position (short or long) in gold, regardless of sign. 
The capital charge will be 8% of the overall net open position 
4.4 Treatment of Options 
In recognition of the extensive variety of banks’ activities in options and the 
difficulties of calculating price risk for options, several alternative methods will be 
allowed at the judgment of the national authority: 
• Those banks which exclusively exercise purchased options will be free to use the 
simplified approach described below; 
• Those banks which also write options will be anticipated to use one of the 
intermediate approaches as set out in below or a complete risk management model 
under the terms of internal models. Generally as the bank use more complicated 
instruments, the more the bank will be expected to use a sophisticated approach. 
In the simplified approach, the option positions and the associated underlying, cash 
or forward, are not matter to the standardized methodology but rather are “carved-
out” and subject to separately calculated capital charges that include both general 
market risk and specific risk. The risk numbers thus produced are then added to the 
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capital charges for the related category, i.e. interest rate related instruments, equities, 
foreign exchange and commodities.  
The delta-plus method employs the sensitivity parameters or “Greek letters” related 
with options to compute their market risk and capital requirements. In this technique, 
the delta-equivalent position of each option turns out to be part of the standardized 
methodology with the delta-equivalent amount subject to the appropriate general 
market risk charges. Separate capital charges are then applied to the gamma and vega 
risks of the option positions. The scenario approach employs simulation techniques 
to compute changes in the value of an options portfolio for alterations in the level 
and volatility of its associated underlyings. Under this approach, the general market 
risk charge is calculated by the scenario “grid” (i.e. the specified combination of 
underlying and volatility changes) that creates the biggest loss. For the delta-plus 
method and the scenario approach the specific risk capital charges are determined 
independently by multiplying the delta-equivalent of each option by the specific risk 
weights  
4.4.1 Simplified approach 
Banks which hold a narrow range of purchased options only will be free to employ 
the simplified approach set out below for particular trades. As an example of how the 
computation would work, if a owner of 100 shares currently valued at $10 each holds 
an equivalent put option with a strike price of $11, the capital charge would be: 
$1,000 x 16% (i.e. 8% specific plus 8% general market risk) = $160, less the amount 
the option is in the money ($11 - $10) x 100 = $100, i.e. the capital charge would be 
$60. A parallel methodology pertains for options whose underlying is a foreign 
currency, an interest rate related instrument or a commodity. 
4.4.2 Intermediate approaches 
4.4.2.1 Delta-plus method 
Banks which write options will be permitted to contain delta-weighted options 
positions within the standardized methodology. Such options must be reported as a 
position equal to the market value of the underlying multiplied by the delta. 
However, as delta does not adequately cover up the risks connected with options 
positions, banks have to measure gamma (which measures the rate of change of 
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delta) and vega (which measures the sensitivity of the value of an option with respect 
to a change in volatility) sensitivities in order to compute the total capital 
requirement. These sensitivities will be calculated according to an accepted exchange 
model or to the bank’s proprietary options pricing model subject to approval of the 
national authority. 
Delta-weighted positions with debt securities or interest rates as the underlying will 
be put into the interest rate time-bands, under the following procedure. 
A two-legged method should be used as for other derivatives, at the first step the 
underlying contract takes effect and in second step the underlying contract matures. 
For example, if bank has bought a call option which is June three-month interest-rate 
future, this option has two legs naturally and its first leg matures in five months and 
should be put in maturity ladder according to delta equivalent value with a maturity 
of five months and a short position with a maturity of two months. Similarly the 
written option will be slotted as a long position with a maturity of two months and a 
short position with a maturity of five months. Floating rate instruments with caps or 
floors will be considered as a mixture of floating rate securities and a series of 
European-style options. For example, the holder of a three-year floating rate bond 
referenced to six month LIBOR with a cap of 15% will treat it as: 
(i) A debt security that repricing every six months; and 
(ii) A series of five written call options on a FRA with a reference rate of 15%, each 
with a negative sign at the time the underlying FRA takes effect and a positive sign 
at the time the underlying FRA matures 
Generally speaking the capital charge for options with equities as the underlying is 
calculated using delta equivalent of the options. For this calculation each national 
market assumed as different market underlying. For delta risk, the net delta-based 
equivalent of the foreign currency and gold options will be included into the 
measurement of the exposure for the own currency (or gold) position. The capital 
charge for options on commodities will be based on the simplified or the maturity 
ladder approach. 
Basle II comes another risk factor which concerns with gamma and vega risks of 
options. The delta-plus method user banks will be required to calculate the gamma 
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and vega for each option position (including hedge positions) separately. The capital 
charges should be calculated in the following way: 
(i) For each individual option a “gamma impact” should be computed according to 
a Taylor series expansion as: 
Gamma impact = ½ x Gamma x VU²     (4.1) 
where  
VU = Variation of the underlying of the option. 
(ii) VU will be calculated as follows: 
• If the option is an interest rate option market value of the option should be 
multiplied by corresponding weight. An equivalent computation should be carried 
out where the underlying is an interest rate, again based on the assumed changes in 
the corresponding yield; 
• For options on equities and equity indices: the market value of the underlying 
should be multiplied by 8%; 
• For foreign exchange and gold options: the market value of the underlying should 
be multiplied by 8%; 
• For options on commodities: the market value of the underlying should be 
multiplied by 15%. 
(iii) For the reason of this calculation the following positions should be assumed as 
the same underlying: 
• For interest rates, if they belong same time-band  
• For equities and stock indices, each national market; 
• For foreign currencies and gold, each currency pair and gold; 
(iv) Every option has a positive or negative gamma effect. These individual gamma 
impacts are summed in order to evaluate total gamma impact. The capital charge 
imposed only those net gamma impacts that are negative will be included in the 
capital calculation. 
(v) The total gamma capital charge will be the sum of the absolute value of the net 
negative gamma impacts as calculated above. 
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(vi) For volatility risk, banks will be required to compute the capital charges by 
multiplying the sum of the vegas for all options on the same underlying, as defined 
above, by a relative shift in volatility of ± 25%. 
(vii) The total capital charge for vega risk is equal to the sum of the absolute value of 
the individual capital charges that have been calculated for vega risk. 
4.4.2.2 Scenario approach 
Banks which are using more sophisticated options are free to develop their own 
models to base the market risk capital charge for options portfolios and associated 
hedging positions on scenario matrix analysis. These values can be calculated via pre 
determined movements on option’s risk factors and calculating changes in the value 
of the option portfolio at various points along this “grid”. In order to determine these 
impacts banks reprice their own option portfolios according to assumptions on 
underlying rate or price and in the volatility of that rate or price. As a substitute, at 
the judgment of each national authority, banks which are important traders in options 
will be permitted to base the calculation on a minimum of six sets of time-bands for 
interest rate options. When using this method, not more than three of the time-bands 
should be combined into any one set. 
The options and their hedge transactions have to be evaluated specific range above 
and below of the current value of the underlying. Alternative method user banks 
should use different price bands to calculate gamma impact for interest rate options 
for each set of time-bands. The other ranges are ± 8% for equities, ± 8% for foreign 
exchange and gold, and ± 15% for commodities. For all risk categories, at least seven 
observations (including the current observation) should be used to divide the variety 
into equally spaced intervals. 
The second dimension of the matrix involves a change in the volatility of the 
underlying rate or price. A single alteration in the volatility of the underlying rate or 
price equivalent to a shift in volatility of + 25% and - 25% is expected to be 
sufficient in most cases. As conditions warrant, however, the supervisory authority 
may decide to require that a different change in volatility be used and/or that middle 
points on the grid be calculated. 
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After forming the matrix every cell holds the net profit or loss of the option and the 
underlying hedge tool. The capital charge for each underlying will then be calculated 
as the largest loss enclosed in the matrix. 
The implementation of the scenario analysis by any specific bank will be subject to 
managerial permission, particularly as regards the exact way that the analysis is 
constructed. Banks’ use of scenario analysis as part of the standardized methodology 
will also be subject to support by the national authority. 
In drawing up these intermediate methods the Committee has wanted to cover the 
major risks connected with options. In doing so, it is aware that so far as specific risk 
is considered, only the delta-related elements are captured; to deal with other risks 
would require a much more complex system. On the other hand, in other areas the 
simplifying assumptions used have resulted in a comparatively conservative 
treatment of definite options positions. For these reasons, the Committee plans to 
keep this area under close review. 
In addition the options risks cited above, the Committee is aware of the other risks 
also associated with options, e.g. rho (rate of change of the value of the option with 
respect to the interest rate) and theta (rate of change of the value of the option with 
respect to time). While not suggested a measurement system for those risks at 
present, it expects banks undertaking important options business at the very least to 
monitor such risks closely. In addition, banks will be allowed to incorporate rho into 
their capital calculations for interest rate risk, if they wish to do so. 
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5. USE OF INTERNAL MODELS TO MEASURE MARKET RISKS 
Main aim of this thesis is establishing an alternative model to standardised approach. 
Therefore this part of the thesis is intended to state main guidelines in designing an 
internal model to monitor market risks. 
5.1 General Criteria 
The use of an internal model will be conditional upon the clear approval of the 
bank’s supervisory authority. Banks which carry out material trading activities on 
different countries have to get approval from both country authorities. 
The supervisory authority will only give its support if at a minimum: 
 It is satisfied that the bank’s risk management system is theoretically sound 
and is applying with honesty; 
 The bank has enough numbers of staff skilled in the use of sophisticated 
models not only in the trading area but also in the risk control, audit, and if essential, 
back office areas, in the supervisory authority’s sight; 
 The bank’s models have a confirmed track record of reasonable accuracy in 
measuring risk, in the managerial authority’s judgment; 
 The bank regularly performs stress tests. 
In some cases supervisory authorities can monitor banks’ internal model and make 
tests on it before it is used for supervisory capital purposes. 
5.2 Qualitative Standards 
It is very important that supervisory authorities have to feel that banks which use 
internal models have market risk management systems that are theoretically sound 
and implemented realistically. As a result supervisory authorities have to set some 
qualitative criteria that banks have to meet in order to implement and measure their 
market risks via a model-based approach. The model’s success rate directly 
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determines multiplication factor set by supervisory authority. Only the models which 
have ideal compliance with BASLE II requirements have minimum multiplication 
factor.  
Generally speaking every bank has to have a self-governing risk control unit. This 
unit is responsible for monitoring and measuring market risk of the bank. The unit 
should create daily, weekly, monthly and or quarterly (if necessary) reports and 
should directly report them to senior management. The unit must be independent 
from trading department.  
The Risk Management unit has to make back-tests concerning measurement of 
model’s success rate. That is, the unit should calculate actual loss of the bank during 
the trading day and compare this actual daily loss with its initial loss estimation.  
The unit should also perform the initial and on-going justification of the internal 
model. 
Bank’s senior management and board of directors should be actively involved in 
bank’s risk management activities and should believe that risk management system is 
an important part of the bank management and its actions directly influence bank’s 
profit. For this purpose the daily reports of risk management should be examined by 
management levels which have right to reduce bank’s positions in order to decrease 
bank’s risk exposure. 
The daily risk management model of the bank should be directly integrated to bank’s 
day-to-day risk management processes. Therefore the unit’s output is main part of 
monitoring, planning, and controlling bank’s market risk profile. 
The risk management system should be designed to be in parallel with internal 
trading and exposure limits. Additionally its principles have to be explained to 
bank’s traders and they have to follow their exposures according to limit structure.  
Banks should make stress tests on their portfolios regularly and should present their 
findings according to a predefined program. The stress test results should be checked 
by board of directors and they have to follow bank’s capital adequacy ratio with the 
effect of these stress tests as well. Stress tests may tell particular weakness to a given 
set of circumstances and prompt steps should be taken to handle those risks 
appropriately (e.g. by hedging against that outcome or reducing the size of the bank’s 
exposures or increasing capital). 
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Banks should have well designed procedures that give information about basic 
principles of risk management structure. The procedures include theoretical 
explanations of risk measurement models used in bank. The internal control points 
and control procedures also have to be included in those procedures.  
Internal auditing system of the bank should make detailed analysis on risk 
management department’s outputs at least once a year and should specifically 
address, at a minimum: 
 The sufficiency of the documentation of the risk management system and 
process; 
 The structure of the risk control unit; 
 The combination of market risk measures into daily risk management; 
 The authorization process for risk pricing models and valuation systems used 
by front and back-office personnel; 
 The justification of any important change in the risk measurement process; 
 The extent of market risks included by the risk measurement model; 
 The reliability of the management information system; 
 The correctness and completeness of position data; 
 The verification of the uniformity, timeliness and consistency of data sources 
used to run internal models, including the independence of such data sources; 
 The correctness and appropriateness of volatility and correlation assumptions; 
 The correctness of valuation and risk transformation calculations; 
  The confirmation of the model’s correctness through frequent back-testing as 
described above. 
5.3 Specification of Market Risk Factors 
One of the major parts of the bank’s risk management framework is decision of risk 
factors because these risk factors are assumed as main determinant of bank’s returns, 
meaning these factors represent actual position of bank’s trading positions. Of course 
bank’s risk factors should be good enough to capture risks that are embedded in 
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bank’s positions. Although banks have some judgment in stating risk factors for their 
internal models, the following guidelines should be satisfied. 
For interest rates, banks should have a set of risk factors representing interest rates of 
each currency on which the bank has interest-rate-sensitive on- or off-balance sheet 
positions. 
The assumed yield curve of the bank should be modeled via commonly accepted 
methodology, for instance, by estimation of zero coupon yields’ forward rates. In 
order to see the variance of interest rate volatility, the yield curve should be separated 
into various maturity segments; generally Basle committee expects one risk factor to 
each maturity interval. For material positions bank’s have to have at least six 
different risk factors to model bank’s risks. However, the number of risk factors used 
in modeling process can be higher for the portfolios which have large number of 
securities with wide range of maturities in order to capture interest rate risk 
accurately. 
Different risk factors should be included in risk measurement system to contain 
spread risk. Different types of approaches can be used to include the spread risk 
arising from less than completely correlated movements between government and 
other fixed-income interest rates, such as identifying a totally different yield curve 
for non-government fixed-income instruments (for instance, swaps or municipal 
securities) or predicting the spread over government rates at different points along 
the yield curve. 
In modeling exchange rates (which may include gold), measurement system of the 
bank should contain risk factor of corresponding foreign currencies. Given that the 
value-at-risk figure extracted from bank’s risk management system is expressed in 
terms of domestic currency, the positions other than domestic currency create a 
foreign exchange risk. Therefore bank’s risk management system has to include a 
risk factor corresponding to major exposures of each currency. 
For equity prices, there should be risk factors corresponding to each of the equity 
markets in which the bank holds significant positions: 
At least, there should be a risk factor that is intended to capture market-wide 
movements in equity prices (e.g. a market index). When bank holds positions in 
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individual securities or in sector indices which can be expressed in “beta-
equivalents” relative to this market wide index; 
 A rather more comprehensive approach would be to have risk factors 
subsequent to a variety of sectors of the whole equity market (for example, industry 
sectors or cyclical and non-cyclical sectors). As above, positions in individual stocks 
inside every sector could be expressed in beta-equivalents relative to the sector 
index; 
 The broadest approach would be to have risk factors corresponding to the 
volatility of individual equity issues. 
The complexity and environment of the modeling method for a given market should 
monitor the bank’s overall market as well as its concentration in individual equity 
issues in that market. 
If bank has commodity positions, risk factors reflecting exposure of bank on the 
commodity should be employed in risk management system of bank.  
For banks with relatively small positions in commodity-based instruments, a simple 
specification of risk factors would be appropriate. Such a condition would probably 
involve one risk factor for each commodity price to which the bank is exposed. In 
conditions where the cumulative positions are relatively small, it might be adequate 
to employ a single risk factor for a comparatively broad sub-category of commodities 
(for example, a single risk factor for all types of gold); 
For further dynamic trading, the model must also consider variation in the 
“convenience yield” between derivatives positions such as forwards and swaps and 
cash positions in the product. 
5.4 Quantitative Standards 
Banks will have flexibility in developing the precise nature of their models, but the 
following minimum standards will concern for the purpose of calculating their 
capital charge. Individual banks or their supervisory authorities will have right to 
employ stricter standards.  
(a) “Value-at-risk” must be calculated on daily basis. 
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(b) In value-at-risk calculations, 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence interval 
should be used. 
(c) In calculation of value-at-risk, an immediate price hit equivalent to a 10 day 
movement in prices is to be used, i.e. the smallest “holding period” will be ten 
trading days. Banks may employ value-at-risk numbers computed according to 
shorter holding periods leveled up to ten days by the square root of time. 
(d) The choice of historical observation period (sample period) for measuring value-
at-risk should not be less than one year. For banks that use a weighting system or 
other methods for the past observation period, the “efficient” observation period 
must be at least one year (that is, the weighted average time cover of the individual 
observations cannot be less than 6 months). 
(e) Banks should revise their data sets frequently; meaning should not be more than 
every three months and should also reconsider them when market prices are subject 
to material changes. Banks may also have to recalculate its value-at-risk measures 
based on shorter time horizons at the request of supervisory authority.  
(f) Banks can use any type of model they want as long as model captures all the risks 
carried by bank. For instance, banks can use variance-covariance matrices, historical 
simulations or Monte Carlo simulations.  
(g) Banks will have judgment to recognize pragmatic correlations within broad risk 
categories (e.g. interest rates, exchange rates, equity prices and commodity prices, 
including related options volatilities in each risk factor category). The supervisory 
authority may also identify empirical correlations across wide risk factor categories, 
provided that the supervisory authority is satisfied that the bank’s system for 
monitoring correlations is sound and implemented with integrity. 
(h) Banks’ models must exactly capture the unique risks related with options within 
each of the extensive risk categories. The following criteria apply to the 
measurement of options risk: 
 Banks’ models should include non-linear price characteristics of options 
positions; 
 Banks are anticipated to eventually move towards the application of a full 10 
day price shock to options positions or positions that exhibit option-like 
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characteristics. In the interim, national authorities may want banks to change their 
capital measure for options risk through other methods, e.g. periodic simulations or 
stress testing; 
 Each bank’s risk measurement system must contain a set of risk factors that 
represents the volatilities of the rates and prices underlying option positions, i.e. vega 
risk. Banks with quite large and/or complex options portfolios should have 
comprehensive specifications of the related volatilities. This means that banks should 
measure the volatilities of options positions broken down by diverse maturities. 
(i) Minimum capital requirement of the bank is calculated via maximum of following 
two figures. (i) Its previous day’s value-at-risk figure calculated according to the 
model parameters. (ii) An average of the daily value-at-risk figures on each of the 
past sixty business days, multiplied by a multiplication factor. 
(j) The multiplication factor shows the degree of model correctness. The factor set by 
national authorities and its smallest amount is 3. In addition of this multiplication 
factor banks have another multiplication number in the range of (0, 1). This number 
directly depends on the past success rate of the model. The success rate of model can 
be measured by the procedure called as “backtesting.”. If the backtesting results of 
the model is satisfactory and the model meets the standards stated above, the factor 
becomes zero. The Basle committee publishes a document which gives details of this 
factor usage. Supervisors will have national judgment to involve banks to perform 
backtesting on either hypothetical (i.e. using changes in portfolio value that would 
occur where end-of-day positions to remain unchanged), or actual trading (i.e. 
excluding fees, commissions, and net interest income) outcomes, or both. 
(k) Banks using models will also be subject to a capital charge to wrap specific risk 
(as defined under the standardized approach for market risk) of interest rate related 
instruments and equity securities. 
5.5 Stress Testing 
Internal model user banks have to employ reliable and precise stress testing programs 
in order to see their actual exposures to severe events. Stress testing to recognize 
events or influences that could significantly impact banks is a key component of a 
bank’s assessment of its capital position. 
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Banks’ stress scenarios require wrapping a range of factors that can create 
unexpected losses or gains in trading portfolios or make the control of risk in those 
portfolios very complex. These factors contain low-probability events in all major 
types of risks, including the various components of market, credit, and operational 
risks. Stress scenarios require shedding light on the crash of such events on positions 
that display both linear and nonlinear price characteristics (i.e. options and 
instruments that have options-like characteristics). 
Stress tests have quantitative and qualitative nature; these tests reflect both market 
risk and liquidity risk of sudden market movements. Quantitative criteria should 
identify reasonable stress scenarios to which banks could be exposed. Qualitative 
criteria should point out that two major goals of stress testing are to assess the 
capacity of the bank’s capital to absorb potential great losses and to identify steps the 
bank can take to decrease its risk and save capital. This assessment is essential for 
setting and evaluating bank’s management strategy and the consequences of stress 
testing should be regularly talked to senior management and periodically to the 
bank’s board of directors. 
Banks should merge the use of supervisory stress scenarios with stress tests created 
by banks themselves to reveal their specific risk characteristics. Specifically, 
supervisory authorities may require banks to give information on stress testing in 
three broad areas which are discussed in turn below. 
5.5.1 Supervisory scenarios requiring no simulations by the bank 
Banks should have data on the largest losses occurred during the reporting era 
available for supervisory examination. This loss data could be judged against to the 
level of capital that results from a bank’s internal measurement system. For example, 
it could offer supervisory authorities with a picture of how many days of peak day 
losses would have been enclosed by a given value-at-risk prediction. 
5.5.2 Scenarios requiring a simulation by the bank 
The stress tests should be performed on bank’s portfolios and these results should be 
presented to supervisory authorities as well. These scenarios could include testing the 
present portfolio against historical bad days which have significant disturbance, for 
example, the 1987 equity crash, the ERM crises of 1992 and 1993 or the fall in bond 
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markets in the first quarter of 1994, March 2001 “Tezkere” crises in Turkey 
incorporating both the large price shifts and the quick decrease in liquidity associated 
with these events. Another type of scenario would assess the compassion of the 
bank’s market risk disclosure to alterations in the assumptions about volatilities and 
correlations. Application of this test would require an assessment of the historical 
range of variation for volatilities and correlations and valuation of the bank’s current 
positions against the extreme values of the historical range. Due consideration should 
be given to the quick difference happened in a matter of days in periods of important 
market disturbance.  
5.5.3 Scenarios developed by the bank itself to capture the specific 
characteristics of its portfolio. 
In addition to the scenarios set by supervisory authorities, a bank should also build 
up its own stress tests which it recognizes as most adverse based on the 
characteristics of its portfolio. Banks should offer supervisory authorities with an 
explanation of the method used to recognize and carry out the scenarios as well as 
with an explanation of the results resulting from these scenarios. 
The consequences should be evaluated periodically by senior management and 
should be reflected in the policies and limits set by management and the board of 
directors. Furthermore, if the testing tells particular weakness to a given set of 
circumstances, the national authorities would anticipate the bank to take prompt steps 
to supervise those risks properly (e.g. by hedging against that outcome or reducing 
the size of its exposures). 
5.6 External Validation 
The validation of models’ accuracy by external auditors and/or supervisory 
authorities includes at least followings: 
(a) Verifying that the internal validation processes are working in an acceptable 
manner; 
(b) Ensuring that the formula used in the computation process as well as for the 
pricing of options and other complex components are validated by a competent unit, 
which should be self-governing from the trading area, in all cases; 
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(c) Checking that the organization of internal models is sufficient with respect to the 
bank’s activities and geographical coverage; 
(d) Checking the consequences of the banks’ back-testing of its internal measurement 
system (i.e. evaluating value-at-risk estimates with actual profits and losses) to 
guarantee that the model gives a reliable measure of potential losses over time. This 
means that banks should make the results as well as the underlying inputs to their 
value-at-risk calculations accessible to their supervisory authorities and/or external 
auditors on demand; 
(e) Making sure that data flows and processes connected with the risk measurement 
system are transparent and available. In particular, it is essential that auditors or 
supervisory authorities are in a position to have straightforward access, whenever 
they judge it necessary and under suitable procedures, to the models’ specifications 
and parameters. 
5.7 Combination of Internal Models and the Standardized Methodology 
As a general law, if a bank has a significant exposure in a risk factor, internal model 
approach says that the internal model should occupy this risk factor as well. 
Therefore, banks which begin to employ models for one or more risk factor 
categories will, over time, be projected to expand the models to all their market risks. 
A bank which has developed one or more models will no longer be able to turn back 
measuring the risk by those models according to the standardized methodology 
(except the supervisory authorities withdraw authorization for that model). However, 
awaiting further knowledge regarding the process of changing to a models-based 
approach, no specific time limit will be set for banks which use a combination of 
internal models and the standardized methodology to move to a complete model. 
The following criteria will relate to banks using such combinations: 
(a) Each big risk factor group must be evaluated by means of a single approach 
(either internal models or the standardized approach), i.e. no mixture of the two 
methods will in principle be allowed within a risk category or across banks’ different 
entities for the same type of risk  
(b) Banks may not change the mixture of two approaches they use without justifying 
to their supervisory authority that they have a good reason for doing so;  
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(c) No element of market risk may run off measurement, i.e. the exposure for all the 
diverse risk factors, whether calculated according to the standardized approach or 
internal models would have to be captured; 
(d) The capital charges judged under the standardized approach and under the models 
approach are to be combined according to the simple sum method. 
5.8 Treatment of Specific Risk 
Wherever a bank has a VaR measure that includes specific risk and that satisfies all 
the qualitative and quantitative necessities for general risk models, it may base its 
charge on modeled estimations, given the measure is based on models that satisfy the 
extra criteria and requirements defined below. Banks which are not capable to meet 
these extra criteria and requirements will be required to base their specific risk 
capital charge on the full amount of the specific risk charge computed under the 
standardized method. 
The criteria for supervisory respect of banks’ modeling of specific risk involve that a 
bank’s model must capture all material components of price risk and be reactive to 
changes in market conditions and components of portfolios. In particular, the model 
must: 
 Explain the historical price deviation in the portfolio; 
 Capture concentrations (magnitude and changes in composition); 
 Be strong in an adverse environment; 
 Capture event risk; 
 Be certified through backtesting. 
Where a bank is expose to event risk that is not included in its VaR measure because 
it is ahead of the 10-day holding period and 99 percent confidence interval (i.e. low 
probability and high severity events), banks must guarantee that the shock of such 
events is factored in to its in-house capital assessment, for example through stress 
testing. 
The bank’s model must normally evaluate the risk arising from less liquid positions 
and/or positions with restricted price precision under realistic market situations. In 
addition, the model must satisfy minimum data standards. Substitutes may be used 
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only where available data is inadequate or is not reflective of the true volatility of a 
position or portfolio, and only where they are properly conservative. Further, as 
techniques and best practices develop, banks should benefit themselves of these 
advances. 
In addition, the bank must have an approach in place to capture in its regulatory 
capital default risk of its trading book positions which expand the risk captured by 
the VaR-based computation as specified above. To get rid of double counting a bank 
may take into account the scope to which default risk has already been included into 
the VaR calculation, particularly for risk positions that could be closed within 10 
days in the event of bad market conditions or other signals of decline in the credit 
atmosphere. No specific method for capturing the incremental default risk is set; it 
may be part of the bank's internal model or a supplement from a separate 
computation. Where a bank captures its incremental risk through a surcharge, the 
surcharge will not be subject to a multiplier or regulatory backtesting, even though 
the bank should be able to show that the surcharge satisfies its target. 
Whichever method is used, the bank must demonstrate that it has a reliable standard 
comparable to that of the internal-ratings based approach for credit risk as set forth in 
the Basle II Framework, under the supposition of a steady level of risk, and 
accustomed where suitable to reflect the crash of liquidity, concentrations, hedging, 
and optionality. Banks which cannot measure its own incremental default risk should 
withdraw their internal model usage request. 
Whichever method is used, cash or synthetic disclosures that would be subject to an 
assumption treatment under the securitization framework set forth in the Basle II 
Framework (e.g. equity trenches that absorb first losses), as well as securitization 
disclosures that are unrated liquidity lines or letters of credit, would be subject to a 
capital charge that is no less than that set forth in the securitization framework. 
An exception to this conduct could be given to the banks that are dealers in the above 
exposures where they can reveal, in addition to trading meaning that a liquid two-
way market exists for the securitization exposures or, in the case of synthetic 
securitizations that rely exclusively on credit derivatives, for the securitization 
exposures themselves or all their ingredient risk components. For purposes of this 
section, a two-way market is assumed to exist where there are self-governing tenders 
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to buy and sell so that a price realistically related to the last sales price or current 
competitive bid and offer quotations can be determined within one day and settled at 
such price within a relatively short time in compliance to trade custom. In addition, 
for a bank to apply this exclusion, it must have adequate market data to ensure that it 
completely captures the concentrated default risk of these exposures in its internal 
approach for measuring the incremental default risk in accordance with the standards 
set above. 
Banks that already have received specific risk model credit for particular portfolios 
or lines of business should agree a schedule with their supervisors to bring their 
model in line with the new standards in an appropriate manner as is practicable. 
Banks which apply modeled guess of specific risk are required to perform 
backtesting aimed at judging whether specific risk is being accurately captured. The 
method a bank should utilize for validating its specific risk estimates is to make 
separate backtests on sub-portfolios using daily data on sub-portfolios subject to 
specific risk. The key sub-portfolios for this principle are traded-debt and equity 
positions. On the other hand, if a bank divides its trading portfolio into finer 
categories (e.g. emerging markets, traded corporate debt, etc.), it is suitable to 
maintain these distinctions for sub-portfolio backtesting purposes. Banks are 
necessary to commit to a sub-portfolio structure and stick to it unless it can be 
demonstrated to the supervisor that it would make sense to modify the structure 
Banks are required to have in place a procedure to examine exceptions identified 
through the backtesting of specific risk. This process is intended to provide as the 
fundamental way in which banks correct their models of specific risk in the 
occurrence they become incorrect. There will be an assumption that models that 
include specific risk are “unacceptable” if the results at the sub-portfolio level create 
a number of exceptions equal with the Red Zone as defined in committee documents. 
Banks with “improper” specific risk models are anticipated to take instant action to 
correct the problem in the model and to guarantee that there is a sufficient capital 
buffer to absorb the risk that the backtest showed had not been sufficiently captured. 
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5.9 Model Validation Standards 
It is vital that banks have procedures in place to guarantee that their internal models 
have been effectively licensed by properly qualified parties, free of the development 
process to guarantee that they are theoretically sound and sufficiently capture all 
material risks. This validation should be done when the model is originally 
developed and when any major changes are made to the model. The validation 
should also be performed on a periodic basis but particularly where there have been 
any significant structural changes in the market or changes to the composition of the 
portfolio which might cause to the model no longer being adequate. More general 
model validation is mostly important where specific risk is also modeled and is 
necessary to meet the further specific risk criteria. As techniques and best practices 
develop, banks should benefit themselves of these advances. Model validation should 
not be limited to backtesting, but should, at a minimum, also contain the following: 
(a) Tests to prove that any assumptions done within the internal model are suitable 
and do not underestimate risk. This may contain the statement of the normal 
distribution, the use of the square root of time to scale from a one day holding period 
to a 10 day holding period or where extrapolation or interpolation methods are used, 
or pricing models; 
(b) Further to the regulatory backtesting programs, testing for model validation 
should be carried out by means of extra tests, which may contain, for instance: 
 Testing carried out using theoretical changes in portfolio worth that would 
happen where end-of-day positions to remain unaffected. It consequently excludes 
fees, commissions, bid-ask spreads, net interest income and intra-day trading; 
 Testing carried out for longer periods than necessary for the regular 
backtesting program (e.g. 3 years). The longer time period usually improves the 
power of the backtesting. A longer time period may not be attractive if the VaR 
model or market conditions have changed to the degree that historical data is no 
longer appropriate; 
 Testing carried out by means of confidence intervals other than the 99 percent 
interval required under the quantitative standards; 
 Testing of portfolios below the general bank level; 
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(c) The use of theoretical portfolios to guarantee that the model is able to account for 
particular structural features that may occur, for example: 
 Where data histories for a particular instrument do not meet the quantitative 
standards and where the bank has to map these positions to substitutes, then the bank 
must guarantee that the substitutes create conservative results under relevant market 
scenarios; 
 Guaranteeing that material basis risks are sufficiently captured. This may 
contain mismatches between long and short positions by maturity or by issuer;  
 Ensuring that the model captures concentration risk that may emerge in an 
undiversified portfolio. 
5.10 Backtesting  
Banks that implement an internal model-based approach to market risk measurement 
regularly compare daily profits and losses with model-generated risk measures to 
determine the superiority and correctness of their risk measurement systems. This 
procedure, known as "backtesting", has been found useful by many institutions as 
they have developed and introduced their risk measurement models. 
As a technique for assessing the power of a firm’s risk measurement model, 
backtesting continues to develop. New approaches to backtesting are still being 
developed and discussed within the broader risk management society. At present, 
different banks make different types of backtesting comparisons and the standards of 
interpretation also vary somewhat across banks. Active efforts to develop and refine 
the methods currently in use are under way, with the goal of distinguishing more 
sharply between precise and inaccurate risk models. 
The spirit of all backtesting efforts is the judgment of actual trading results with 
model-generated risk measures. If this comparison is close enough, the backtest 
raises no questions about the superiority of the risk measurement model. In some 
cases, however, the comparison tells sufficient differentiations that problems almost 
definitely must exist, either with the model or with the assumptions of the backtest. 
In between these two cases is a grey area where the test results are, on their own, 
uncertain. 
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The Basle Committee thinks that backtesting proposes the best opportunity for 
incorporating suitable incentives into the internal models approach in a manner that 
is steady and that will cover a variety of circumstances. Certainly, many of the public 
comments on the April 1995 internal models plan stressed the need to keep strong 
incentives for the constant development of banks’ internal risk measurement models. 
In considering how to include backtesting more closely into the internal models 
approach to market risk capital requirements, the Committee required to disclose 
both the fact that the industry has not yet settled on a single backtesting methodology 
and concerns over the defective nature of the signal generated by backtesting. 
The Committee thinks that the framework outlined below strikes an appropriate 
balance between recognition of the potential limits of backtesting and the need to put 
in place suitable incentives. At the same time, the Committee recognizes that the 
methods for risk measurement and backtesting are still developing, and the 
Committee is dedicated to incorporate important new developments in these areas 
into its structure. 
The backtesting framework that is to accompany the internal models capital 
requirement is described in the following paragraphs. The aim of this structure is the 
encouragement of more precise approaches to backtesting and the supervisory 
understanding of backtesting results. The next section deals with the nature of the 
backtests themselves, while the section that follows concerns the supervisory 
explanation of the results and sets out the settled standards of the Committee in this 
regard. 
5.10.1 Description of the backtesting framework 
The backtesting structure developed by the Committee is based on that it is adopted 
by many of the banks using internal market risk measurement models. These 
backtesting programs classically consist of a periodic evaluation of the bank’s daily 
value-at-risk measures with the successive daily profit or loss ("trading outcome"). 
The value-at-risk measures are proposed to be larger than all but a certain part of the 
trading outcomes could be larger than projected VaR figures, where that portion is 
determined by the confidence level of the value-at-risk measure. Evaluating the risk 
measures with the trading outcomes just means that the bank counts up the number 
of times that the risk measures were bigger than the trading outcome. The portion 
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really covered can then be compared with the planned level of coverage to measure 
the performance of the bank’s risk model. In some cases, this last step is relatively 
informal, although there are statistical tests that may also be applied. 
The managerial framework for backtesting employs all of the steps identified in the 
preceding paragraph, and tries to set out a steady explanation of each step as it is 
reasonable without imposing unnecessary weights. Under the value-at-risk 
framework, the risk measure is an approximation of the amount that could be lost on 
a set of positions due to general market activities over a given holding period, 
measured using a specified confidence level. 
The backtests to be applied for assessing whether the observed percentage of 
outcomes covered by the risk measure is constant with a 99% level of confidence. 
That is, they try to prove if a bank's 99th percentile risk measures truly cover 99% of 
the firm’s trading outcomes. While it can be argued that the extreme-value nature of 
the 99th percentile makes it harder to estimate consistently than other, lower 
percentiles. 
An additional consideration in specifying the suitable risk measures and trading 
outcomes for backtesting occurs because the value-at-risk approach to risk 
measurement is usually based on the sensitivity of a stable portfolio to instant price 
shocks. That is, end-of-day trading positions are enter into the risk measurement 
model, which assesses the potential change in the value of this static portfolio due to 
price and rate movements over the assumed holding period. 
While this is basic in theory, in practice it makes difficult the topic of backtesting. 
For example, it is frequently disagreed that value-at-risk measures cannot be 
compared against real trading outcomes, since the real outcomes will unavoidably be 
"affected" by alterations in portfolio composition throughout the holding period. 
According to this view, the enclosure of payment income together with trading gains 
and losses resulting from changes in the composition of the portfolio should not be 
included in the description of the trading outcome because they do not transmit to the 
risk inherent in the static portfolio that was assumed in building the value-at-risk 
measure. 
This argument is realistic with regard to the employment of value-at-risk measures 
based on price shocks adjusted to longer holding periods. That is, comparing the ten-
 59 
day, 99th percentile risk measures from the internal models capital requirement with 
actual ten-day trading outcomes would possibly not be a meaningful exercise. In 
particular, in any given ten day period, major changes in portfolio composition 
comparing with the initial positions are common at major trading institutions. For 
this reason, the backtesting framework described here involves the use of risk 
measures adjusted to a one-day holding period. The test would be based on how 
banks model risk internally. 
Given the use of one-day risk measures, it is suitable to use one-day trading 
outcomes as the benchmark to use in the backtesting program. The similar concerns 
about “contamination” of the trading outcomes discussed above continue to be 
relevant, but, even for one-day trading outcomes. That is, there is a concern that the 
overall one-day trading outcome is not a suitable point of comparison, because it 
reveals the effects of intra-day trading, possibly including fee income that is booked 
in association with the sale of new products. 
On the one hand, intra-day trading might cause to raise the volatility of trading 
outcomes, and may result in cases where the general trading outcomes go beyond the 
risk measure. This event obviously does not mean a problem with the methods used 
to compute the risk measure; rather, it is just outside the extent of what the value-at-
risk method is planned to estimate. On the other hand, counting fee income may 
similarly deform the backtest, but in the other direction, since fee income often has 
annuity-like characteristics and this fee income is not normally included in the 
calculation of the risk measure, problems with the risk measurement model could be 
masked by including fee income in the description of the trading outcome used for 
backtesting purposes. 
Some have disagreed that the real trading result experienced by the bank are the most 
important and related figures for risk management functions, and that the risk 
measures should be benchmarked against this truth, even if the hypothesis behind 
their calculations are limited in this regard. Others have also argued that the issue of 
fee income can be addressed sufficiently, although crudely, by simply removing the 
mean of the trading outcomes from their time series before performing the backtests. 
A more complicated approach would entail a detailed attribution of income by 
source, including fees, spreads, market movements, and intra-day trading results. 
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To the extent that the backtesting program is viewed simply as a statistical test of the 
integrity of the calculation of the value-at-risk measure, it is obviously most suitable 
to use a definition of daily trading outcome that allows for an "uncontaminated" test. 
To meet this standard, banks should develop the ability to perform backtests based 
on the hypothetical changes in portfolio value that would occur where end-of-day 
positions to stay unchanged. 
Backtesting using real daily profits and losses is also a helpful exercise since it can 
uncover cases where the risk measures are not precisely capturing trading volatility 
in spite of being calculated with reliability. 
For these reasons, the Committee recommends banks to build up the capability to 
perform backtests using both hypothetical and actual trading outcomes. Even though 
national supervisors may differ in the weight that they wish to put on these different 
approaches to backtesting, it is obvious that each approach has value. In 
combination, the two approaches are likely to provide a strong understanding of the 
relation between intended risk measures and trading outcomes. 
The next step in developing the backtesting program concerns the characteristics of 
the backtest itself, and the frequency with which it is to be performed. The structure 
adopted by the Committee, which is also the simplest procedure for evaluation of the 
risk measures with the trading outcomes, is just to calculate the number of times that 
the trading outcomes are not enclosed by the risk measures ("exceptions"). For 
example, over 300 trading days, a 99% daily risk measure should cover, on average, 
297 of the 300 trading outcomes, leaving three exceptions. 
With regard to the occurrence of the backtest, the desire to base the backtest on as 
many observations as possible must be balanced against the wish to perform the test 
on a regular basis. The backtesting framework to be applied involves a formal testing 
and accounting of exceptions on a quarterly basis using the most recent twelve 
months of data. 
Using the latest twelve months of data gives approximately 250 daily observations 
for the reasons of backtesting. The national supervisor will use the number of 
exceptions (out of 250) generated by the bank’s model as the basis for a supervisory 
response. In many cases, there will be no answer. In other cases, the supervisor may 
start a dialogue with the bank to verify whether there is a problem with a bank’s 
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model. In the most serious cases, the supervisor may require an increase in a bank’s 
capital requirement or forbid use of the model. 
The application of using the number of exceptions as the main reference point in the 
backtesting process is the ease and straightforwardness of this approach. From a 
statistical point of view, using the number of exceptions as the basis for assessing a 
bank’s model requires comparatively a small number of strong assumptions. In 
particular, the primary assumption is that each day’s test (exception/no exception) is 
independent of the outcome of any of the others. 
The Committee of course knows that tests of this type are restricted in their power to 
differentiate an accurate model from an inaccurate model. To a statistician, this says 
that it is not feasible to standardize the test so that it properly signals all the 
problematic models without giving false signals of trouble at many others. This 
limitation has been a vital consideration in the design of the framework presented in 
committee papers, and should also be important among the considerations of national 
supervisors in understanding the results of a bank's backtesting program. However, 
the Committee does not view this restriction as a critical objection to the use of 
backtesting. Rather, conditioning supervisory standards on a clear framework, 
though limited and defective, is seen as preferable to a simply judgmental standard or 
one with no incentive features whatsoever. 
5.10.2 Supervisory framework for the interpretation of backtesting results 
5.10.2.1 Description of three-zone approach 
It is with the statistical boundaries of backtesting in mind that the Committee sets up 
a framework for the supervisory explanation of backtesting results that covers a 
range of potential responses, depending on the power of the signal produced from the 
backtest. These responses are divided into three zones, distinguished by colors into a 
hierarchy of responses. The green zone matches to backtesting results that do not 
themselves propose a problem with the excellence or correctness of a bank's model. 
The yellow zone includes results that do raise problems in this regard, but where 
such a conclusion is not ultimate. The red zone points out a backtesting result that 
almost definitely indicates a problem with a bank’s risk model.  
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The Committee has decided to set standards concerning the definitions of these zones 
with respect of the number of exceptions produced in the backtesting program, and 
these are set forth below. To place these definitions in appropriate perspective, 
however, it is useful to check the probabilities of obtaining various numbers of 
exceptions under different assumptions about the accuracy of a bank’s risk 
measurement model. 
5.10.2.2 Statistical considerations in defining the zones 
Three zones have been defined and their borders chosen in order to balance two 
types of statistical error: (1) the possibility that a precise risk model would be 
classified as incorrect on the basis of its backtesting result, and (2) the possibility that 
an incorrect model would not be classified that way based on its backtesting result. 
Table 5.1 says the possibility of obtaining a particular number of exceptions from a 
sample of 250 independent observations under a number of assumptions about the 
real percentage of results that the model captures (that is, these are binomial 
probabilities). For instance, the left-hand section of Table 5.1 reports probabilities 
related with a precise model (that is, a true coverage level of 99%). Under these 
assumptions, the column labeled "exact" says that exactly five exceptions can be 
anticipated in 6.7% of the samples. 
The right-hand portion of Table 5.1 reports probabilities associated with several 
possible imprecise models, specifically models whose true levels of coverage are 
98%, 97%, 96%, and 95%, respectively. Thus, the column labeled "exact" under an 
implicit coverage level of 97% shows that five exceptions would then be anticipated 
in 10.9% of the samples. 
Table 5.1 also reports several significant error probabilities. For the assumption that 
the model envelopes 99% of outcomes (the preferred level of coverage), the table 
reports the probability that choosing a given number of exceptions as a threshold for 
rejecting the correctness of the model will result in an incorrect rejection of an 
accurate model ("type 1" error). For example, if the threshold is set as low as one 
exception, then correct models will be rejected fully 91.9% of the time, because they 
will escape refusal only in the 8.1% of cases where they create zero exceptions. As 
the threshold number of exceptions is enlarged, the probability of making this type of 
error declines. 
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Under the assumptions that the model’s actual level of coverage is not 99%, Table 
5.1 says the possibility that selecting a given number of exceptions as a threshold for 
rejecting the correctness of the model will result in an mistaken acceptance of a 
model with the implicit (wrong) level of coverage ("type 2" error). For example, if 
the model’s real level of coverage is 97%, and the threshold for rejection is set at 
seven or more exceptions, the table points out that this model would be incorrectly 
accepted 37.5% of the time. 
In understanding the information in Table 5.1, it is also vital to recognize that while 
the alternative models appear close to the preferred standard in probability terms 
(97% is close to 99%), the deviation between these models in terms of the size of the 
risk measures produced can be significant. That is, a bank’s risk measure could be 
considerably less than that of a precise model and still cover 97% of the trading 
outcomes. For example, in the case of normally distributed trading outcomes, the 
97th percentile matches to 1.88 standard deviations, while the 99th percentile 
matches to 2.33 standard deviations, an enlargement of nearly 25%. Thus, the 
supervisory aim to distinguish between models providing 99% coverage, and those 
providing say, 97% coverage, is a very realistic one. 
5.10.2.3 Definition of the green, yellow, and red zones 
The results in Table 5.1 also reveal some of the statistical limitations of backtesting. 
In particular, there is no threshold number of exceptions that gives both a low 
probability of incorrectly rejecting a precise model and a low probability of 
incorrectly accepting all of the relevant imprecise models. It is for this reason that the 
Committee has rejected an approach that contains only one threshold. 
Given these restrictions, the Committee has categorized outcomes into three 
categories. In the first category, the test results are constant with an accurate model, 
and the possibility of inaccurately accepting an inaccurate model is low (green zone). 
At the other extreme, the test results are really unlikely to have resulted from an 
accurate model, and the probability of inaccurately rejecting an accurate model on 
this basis is remote (red zone). In between these two cases, however, is a zone where 
the backtesting results could be either accurate or inaccurate models, and the 
supervisory authority should push a bank to show additional information about its 
model before taking action (yellow zone). 
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Table 5.2 sets out the Committee’s decided boundaries for these zones and the 
presumptive managerial reaction for each backtesting result, based on a sample of 
250 observations. For further sample sizes, the boundaries should be deduced by 
computing the binomial probabilities associated with true coverage of 99%, as in 
Table 5.1. The yellow zone starts at the point such that the probability of getting that 
number or fewer exceptions equals or exceeds 95%. Table 5.2 reports these 
cumulative probabilities for each number of exceptions. For 250 observations, it can 
be understood that five or fewer exceptions will be extracted 95.88% of the time 
when the true level of coverage is 99%. Thus, the yellow zone starts at five 
exceptions. 
In the same way, the beginning of the red zone is defined as the point such that the 
probability of obtaining that number or fewer exceptions equals or exceeds 99.99%. 
Table 5.2 shows that for a sample of 250 observations and a true coverage level of 
99%, this occurs with ten exceptions. 
The green zone 
The green zone needs little clarification. Since a model that really provides 99% 
coverage would be fairly likely to produce as many as four exceptions in a sample of 
250 results, there is little reason for concern raised by backtesting results that fall in 
this range. This is reinforced by the results in Table 5.1, which show that accepting 
outcomes in this range leads to only a little chance of wrongly accepting an 
inaccurate model. 
The yellow zone 
The range from five to nine exceptions composes the yellow zone. Outcomes in this 
range are reasonable for both accurate and inaccurate models, although Table 5.1 
proposes that they are usually more probable for inaccurate models than for accurate 
models. Furthermore, the results in Table 5.1 points out that the assumption that the 
model is imprecise should grow as the number of exceptions increases in the range 
from five to nine. 
The Committee has decided that, within the yellow zone, the number of exceptions 
should usually guide the size of potential supervisory increases in a firm’s capital 
requirement. Table 5.2 sets out the Committee’s agreed guidelines for increases in 
the multiplication factor appropriate to the internal models capital requirement, 
resulting from backtesting results in the yellow zone. 
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These guidelines help in maintaining the proper structure of incentives appropriate to 
the internal models approach. In particular, the possible supervisory penalty 
increases with the number of exceptions. The results in Table 5.1 normally support 
the notion that nine exceptions is a more troubling result than five exceptions, and 
these steps are meant to reflect that. 
These particular values reveal the common idea that the increase in the multiplication 
factor should be sufficient to return the model to a 99th percentile standard. For 
example, five exceptions in a sample of 250 imply only 98% coverage. Thus, the 
raise in the multiplication factor should be sufficient to transform a model with 98% 
coverage into one with 99% coverage. Needless to say, accurate calculations of this 
kind require additional statistical assumptions that are not likely to hold in all cases. 
For example, if the distribution of trading outcomes is assumed to be normal, then 
the ratio of the 99th percentile to the 98th percentile is approximately 1.14, and the 
increase needed in the multiplication factor is therefore approximately 0.40 for a 
scaling factor of 3. If the actual distribution is not normal, but instead has “fat tails”, 
then bigger increases may be required to reach the 99th percentile standard. The 
concern about fat tails was also a significant factor in the selection of the particular 
increments set out in Table 5.2. 
It is important to stress, however, that these increases are not meant to be simply 
automatic. The results in Table 5.1 specify that results in the yellow zone do not 
always mean an imprecise model, and the Committee has no interest in penalizing 
banks exclusively for bad luck. However, to keep the incentives aligned correctly, 
backtesting results in the yellow zone should usually be supposed to involve an 
increase in the multiplication factor unless the bank can reveal that such an increase 
is not warranted. 
In other words, the burden of proof in these situations should not be on the 
supervisor to demonstrate that a problem exists, but rather should be on the bank to 
demonstrate that their model is basically sound. In such a situation, there are many 
different types of additional information that might be related to an assessment of the 
bank’s model. 
For example, it would then be principally valuable to see the results of backtests 
covering disaggregated subsets of the bank’s general trading activities. Many banks 
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that employ in routine backtesting programs break up their overall trading portfolio 
into trading units organized around risk factors or product categories. Disaggregating 
in this manner could allow the tracking of a problem that surfaced at the aggregate 
level back to its source at the level of a precise trading unit or risk model. 
Banks should also document all of the exceptions produced from their ongoing 
backtesting program, including an explanation for the exception. This documentation 
is vital to determine a suitable supervisory response to a backtesting result in the 
yellow zone. Banks may also employ backtesting for confidence intervals other than 
the 99th percentile, or may carry out other statistical tests not considered here. 
Clearly, this information could also prove very helpful in assessing their model. 
In practice, there are several probable explanations for a backtesting exception, some 
of which go to the fundamental integrity of the model, some of which propose an 
underspecified or low-quality model, and some of which propose either bad luck or 
poor intra-day trading results. Classifying the exceptions generated by a bank’s 
model into these categories can be a very useful exercise. 
Basic integrity of the model 
The bank’s systems just are not deal with the risk of the positions themselves (e.g. 
the positions of an overseas office are being reported inaccurately). 
Model volatilities and/or correlations were calculated inaccurately (e.g. the computer 
is dividing by 250 when it should be dividing by 225). 
Model’s accuracy could be enhanced 
The risk measurement model is not evaluating the risk of some instruments with 
adequate accuracy (e.g. too few maturity buckets or an omitted spread). 
Bad luck or markets moved in fashion unanticipated by the model 
Random chance (a very low likelihood event). 
Markets moved by more than the model predicted was likely (i.e. volatility was 
considerably higher than expected) 
Markets did not move together as estimated (i.e. correlations were significantly 
different than what was assumed by the model). 
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Intra-day trading 
There was a big (and money-losing) alteration in the bank’s positions or some other 
income event between the end of the first day (when the risk guess was calculated) 
and the end of the second day (when trading results were tabulated). 
Generally, problems relating to the fundamental integrity of the risk measurement 
model are potentially the most serious. If there are exceptions belonged to this 
category for a particular trading unit, the plus should apply. In addition, the model 
may require of extensive review and/or adjustment, and the manager would be 
expected to take suitable action to guarantee that this occurs. 
The next category of problem (lack of model precision) is one that can likely to occur 
at least part of the time with common risk measurement models. No model can 
expect to achieve unlimited precision, and thus all models entail some amount of 
approximation. If, however, a particular bank’s model seems more prone to this type 
of problem than others, the supervisor should employ the plus factor and also 
consider what other incentives are needed to encourage improvements. 
The third category of problems (markets moved in a way unexpected by the model) 
should also be anticipated to occur at least some of the time with value-at-risk 
models. Especially, even a precise model is not expected to cover 100% of trading 
outcomes. Some exceptions are definitely the random 1% that the model can be 
expected not to cover. In other cases, the performance of the markets may change so 
that previous estimates of volatility and correlation are less appropriate. No value-at-
risk model will be protected from this type of problem; it is natural in the reliance on 
past market behavior as a means of gauging the risk of future market movements. 
Finally, depending on the description of trading outcomes engaged for the purpose of 
backtesting, exceptions could also be emerged by intra-day trading results or an 
unusual event in trading income other than from positioning. Even though exceptions 
for these reasons would not naturally suggest a problem with the bank’s value-at-risk 
model, they could still be cause for supervisory concern and the obligation of the 
plus should be considered. 
The scope to which a trading outcome hits the risk measure is another relevant piece 
of information. All else equal, exceptions produced by trading outcomes far in excess 
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of the risk measure are a matter of bigger concern than are outcomes only slightly 
bigger than the risk measure. 
In deciding whether or not to impose increases in a bank’s capital requirement, it is 
predicted that the supervisor could weigh these factors as well as others, including an 
assessment of the bank’s fulfillment with applicable qualitative standards of risk 
management. Based on the supplementary information provided by the bank, the 
supervisor will choose appropriate course of action. 
Generally, the imposition of a higher capital requirement for outcomes in the yellow 
zone is a suitable reaction when the supervisor thinks the reason for being in the 
yellow zone is a correctable problem in a bank’s model. This can be contrasted with 
the case of an unexpected session of high market volatility, which almost all models 
may fail to forecast. While these events may be stressful, they do not essentially 
specify that a bank’s risk model is in need of redesign. Finally, in the case of 
rigorous problems with the basic integrity of the model, the supervisor should 
consider whether to prohibit the use of the model for capital purposes altogether. 
The red zone 
Lastly, in contrast to the yellow zone where the director may exercise decision in 
interpreting the backtesting results, outcomes in the red zone (ten or more 
exceptions) should normally lead to an automatic assumption that a problem is 
present within bank’s model. This is because it is really unlikely that a precise model 
would separately generate ten or more exceptions from a sample of 250 trading 
outcomes. 
If a bank’s model falls into the red zone, the supervisor should automatically enlarge 
the multiplication factor appropriate to a firm’s model by one (from three to four). It 
is unnecessary to say, the supervisor should also begin examining the reasons why 
the bank’s model created such a large number of misses, and should require the bank 
to begin work on improving its model right away. 
Even if ten exceptions is an extremely high number for 250 observations, there will 
on very rare instances be a valid reason why a precise model will produce a lot of 
exceptions. Especially, when financial markets are subjected to a major regime 
move, many volatilities and correlations can be anticipated to move as well, perhaps 
significantly. Unless a bank is prepared to update its volatility and correlation 
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estimations instantaneously, such a regime shift could produce a number of 
exceptions in a short period of time. Basically, however, these exceptions would all 
be occurring for the same reason, and therefore the suitable supervisory reaction 
might not be the same as if there were ten exceptions, but each from a separate 
incident. For example, one probable supervisory response in this case would be 
simply to require the bank’s model to take account of the regime move as quickly as 
it can, while maintaining the integrity of its procedures for updating the model. 
It should be stressed, however, that the Committee thinks that this exception should 
be permitted only under the strangest circumstances, and that it is committed to an 
automatic and non-discretionary enlargement in a bank’s capital requirement for 
backtesting results that fall into the red zone. 
5.11 Summary 
The above structure is proposed to set out a steady approach for implementing 
backtesting procedure into the internal models methods to market risk capital 
requirements. The goals of this effort have been to build suitable and necessary 
encouragements into a framework that relies deeply on the efforts of banks 
themselves to compute the risks they face, to do so in a way that respects the natural 
limitations of the available tools, and to keep the burdens and costs of the imposed 
procedures to a minimum. 
The Basle Committee thinks that the framework described above provides the right 
balance in this regard. Perhaps more prominently, however, the Committee thinks 
that this approach represents the first, and therefore vital, step towards a tighter 
integration of supervisory guidelines with provable measures of bank performance. 
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Table 5.1: Definition of zones 
Model is accurate Model is inaccurate: Posible alternative levels of coverage 
Exceptions  Coverage=99% Exceptions  Coverage=98% Coverage=97% Coverage=96% Coverage=95% 
(Out of 250) exact type 1 (Out of 250) exact type 1 exact type 1 exact type 1 exact type 1 
0 8.1% 100.0% 0 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1 20.5% 91.9% 1 3.3% 0.6% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2 25.7% 71.4% 2 8.3% 3.9% 1.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
3 21.5% 45.7% 3 14.0% 12.2% 3.8% 1.9% 0.7% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 
4 13.4% 24.2% 4 17.7% 26.2% 7.2% 5.7% 1.8% 0.9% 0.3% 0.1% 
5 6.7% 10.8% 5 17.7% 43.9% 10.9% 12.8% 3.6% 2.7% 0.9% 0.5% 
6 2.7% 4.1% 6 14.8% 61.6% 13.8% 23.7% 6.2% 6.3% 1.8% 1.3% 
7 1.0% 1.4% 7 10.5% 76.4% 14.9% 37.5% 9.0% 12.5% 3.4% 3.1% 
8 0.3% 0.4% 8 6.5% 86.9% 14.0% 52.4% 11.3% 21.5% 5.4% 6.5% 
9 0.1% 0.1% 9 3.6% 93.4% 11.6% 66.3% 12.7% 32.8% 7.6% 11.9% 
10 0.0% 0.0% 10 1.8% 97.0% 8.6% 77.9% 12.8% 45.5% 9.6% 19.5% 
11 0.0% 0.0% 11 0.8% 98.7% 5.8% 86.6% 11.6% 58.3% 11.1% 29.1% 
12 0.0% 0.0% 12 0.3% 99.5% 3.6% 92.4% 9.6% 69.9% 11.6% 40.2% 
13 0.0% 0.0% 13 0.1% 99.8% 2.0% 96.0% 7.3% 79.5% 11.2% 51.8% 
14 0.0% 0.0% 14 0.0% 99.9% 1.1% 98.0% 5.2% 86.9% 10.0% 62.9% 
15 0.0% 0.0% 15 0.0% 100.0% 0.5% 99.1% 3.4% 92.1% 8.2% 72.9% 
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  Table 5.2: Scaling Factors 
 
Zone 
Number of 
Exceptions 
Increase in 
Scaling Factor 
Cumulative 
Probability 
0 0.00 8.11% 
1 0.00 28.58% 
2 0.00 54.32% 
3 0.00 75.81% 
Green Zone 
4 0.00 89.22% 
5 0.40 95.88% 
6 0.50 98.63% 
7 0.65 99.60% 
8 0.75 99.89% 
Yellow Zone 
9 0.85 99.97% 
Red Zone 10 or more 1.00 99.99% 
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6. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Two methodologies of VaR measures have developed through the last decade. One 
obtained by deriving an analytical valuation of VaR, which depends on given 
parameter estimates, called the parametric approach. The other methodology derives 
VaR by continually performing several simulation steps, including historical and 
Monte Carlo simulations. In this chapter these VaR concepts and their strengths and 
weaknesses are explained. 
6.1 The Need for Unified and Quantified Risk Measure 
Modern finance theory highlights risk as a main determinant of return. Merton 
(1980) states that expected return has a linear relationship with risk. According to 
him, measuring risk as a volatility of return easier than expected return itself. 
Merton’s idea seems clear when applied to an equity portfolio replicating an index. 
On the other hand, it is uncertain when applied to a globally varying portfolio with 
positions traded in entirely segmented markets, as in trading portfolios of financial 
institutions. As a benchmark of the study first risk management techniques of large 
US banks are examined. If we look at trading portfolios of large financial institutions 
like BONY or CitiCorp as it is published in their reports suggests the following two 
observations: The big variety of trading positions, and the difficulty of and the need 
for combining all risk classes underlying those positions in one single measure. The 
trading portfolio of JP these institutions has positions on U.S and foreign 
governments’ securities, corporate securities, and derivative securities of interest 
rates, foreign exchange rates, bonds, equities, and commodity contracts. Each of 
those positions is associated with a special source of risk and different risk 
computation methods which can be seen below. 
The main risk underlying U.S Government securities is the interest rate risk. 
Duration is an easy measure for guessing volatility in the prices of those securities 
and their relationship with interest rates. By estimating convexity and sensitivity 
parameters in the case of non-parallel shift in the term structure of interest rates, 
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duration can be customized to explanation of nonlinearity in the relationship between 
interest rates and government security prices.  
A more complex analysis may entail a parametric quantifying of the matching risk 
factors affecting the term structure of interest rates. For foreign government 
securities, the foreign exchange rate is considered a distinguishing risk factor in 
determining returns. Foreign exchange rates have their individual risk indices, 
spreads, and volatilities. In recent times, target zones have been added to some 
currencies, Risk factors underlying corporate securities are dependent on the type of 
securities held in the portfolio. Additionally if institution has corporate bond, in 
addition to the risk connected with the interest rate, default is a main source of risk 
that correlates with other indices in the economy. One way to measure this risk is to 
use credit rating. For equities, volatility of returns is an easy measure of risk. Many 
models used in finance like the CAPM and the APT uses the correlation between the 
asset and the risk factor as a risk measure. For example, in the CAPM, where the 
only risk factor is the market, the measure of risk (Beta) is the covariance between 
the market and stock returns. 
Risk factors, underlying derivative securities are fundamentally the similar to those 
related with the underlying assets of those derivatives. However, quantifying the risk 
related with each derivative position depends on the form of the relationship between 
the derivative value and the underlying asset price. Forwards and futures prices have 
a linear relationship with the prices of the underlying assets. Consequently, the risk 
connected with those contracts can be expressed as a linear transformation of the risk 
related with the underlying asset. For options, the relationship between the price of 
the option and the price of the underlying asset is non-linear; risk can be measured by 
the Greeks, delta, gamma, theta, vega and rho. Each of these measures reflects the 
rate of change in the price of the option when only one of the parameters change, 
similar to the price of the underlying asset, remaining days to maturity, volatility and 
interest rate, In order to measure risk of the interest rate and currency swaps default 
and recovery model has to be used . This model is used for measuring risk of credit 
derivatives as well. The risk sources which are discussed above main risk source of 
market risk. However financial institutions have credit risk, liquidity risk, legal risk 
and operational risk as well. However, sudden changes in market conditions are the 
most important market risk factor. 
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Every sub-element of the trading portfolio has unique characteristics; therefore every 
element of the portfolio should deal with separately. Generally a risk measurement 
technique suitable for only one element of the portfolio and can not be used in 
different portfolio elements. Obviously, those measures are not additive, or even 
comparable. Therefore risk measures cannot give simple answers to portfolio risk 
level. According to Linsmeier and Pearson these complex portfolio structures 
become widespread after collapse of Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates 
and the publication of the Black-Scholes option pricing formula [6].  
After establishment of Black-Scholes model exchange rates and interest rates have 
greater volatilities than they have ever had. After establishment of options and other 
derivatives market risk became less obvious. With those changes, financial 
institutions enlarged their positions in financial derivatives for both hedging and 
speculative purposes. 
Eventually, this situation end with discovery of a different rationale is provided by 
Jorion (2001) and Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2001). All of them state that the recent 
financial universal distresses were the main reason behind the search for an easy risk 
measurement tool. One way to avoid these above complexities is to look at the 
probability of a given loss to occur during a specified time horizon N, a simple 
statistical measure. List all possible outcomes in each of the N periods and for each 
outcome; assign a probability for the set of lower values to occur. If probability 
distribution of the P&L of a portfolio is known than we can easily calculate 
maximum loss with a requested level of confidence.  
If we have a question like, “what is the worst loss we may undergo over some time 
horizon, say N days?” we can say, “we are c% confident that we are not losing more 
than $V of our wealth over this time horizon.” Notice here that $V is the worst loss 
that would be exceeded by (1-c)%. Equally, we can say that there is a (1-c)% 
probability of losing more than $V of our assets over the next N trading horizon. This 
answer implies that we could lose all of the assets but this event has low probability. 
However, the probability of losing everything depends on our portfolio risk as 
defined by the standard deviation of the profits and losses assuming normal 
distribution.  
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For example, given a time horizon of 100 trading days, and a confidence level of 
95%, our losses will exceed $V1 only in 5 trading days. Here N = 1 day and c = 95%. 
For 99% confidence level, we will suffer losses exceeding $V2 only in one day out 
of 100 trading days or 2-3 days during a trading year, where |V1| < |V2|. This means 
additionally that, for the next trading day, we are 95% sure that our losses will not 
exceed $V1, that is we are 99% sure that our losses for the next trading day will not 
exceed $V2. 
6.2 The Concept of VaR 
Before giving formal definition of Value at Risk, taking a look at to profit and loss 
distribution of Bank of America may be helpful. The figure below represents 
distribution of P&L account of bank’s portfolio [7]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Profit and Loss Distribution of Bank of America 
According to figure we can say that we are 97.2% confident that losses of Bank of 
America will not exceed $20 millions over the next trading day. This means with 
only 2.8 % confidence level bank have losses greater than $20 million USD dollars. 
In addition, we can say that at a 95% confidence level, the losses of Bank of America 
will not exceed $14.5 millions over the next trading day. Notice that 5% of the 
trading days is 12.5 days. We see from the histogram that there are 17 days (6.8% of 
total trading days) the bank suffered from losses exceeding $10 millions and 7 days 
(2.8% of the total trading days) the bank suffered from losses exceeding $20 
millions. Interpolating, we find that the amount of losses that will be exceeded by 5% 
of the trading days is $14.5 millions. The number $14.5 millions is VaR 
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at 95% confidence level over one trading-day time horizon. 
After examination of the histogram the formal definition of Value at Risk as follows: 
Value at Risk or VaR as a quantile measure to quantify the risk for financial 
institutions. It tries to measure actual market risk of the bank’s portfolio. VaR 
measures the worst likely loss over a given horizon under normal market scenarios at 
a given confidence level, As can be seen from formal definition of Value at Risk 
with saying value at risk of our portfolio is equal to V, we mean “We are c percent 
certain that we will not lose more than V dollars in the next N days”. Here the 
variable V is the VaR of the portfolio. VaR function has two parameters: a time 
period (horizon), N, and a confidence level c. Thus, when we calculate VaR for a 
portfolio of a financial institution we calculate the expected loss in the portfolio’s 
market value over a given horizon such as one day or two weeks, N, that is exceeded 
with a small probability say 1 percent, 1-c. Accordingly, VaR is defined as the upper 
limit of the one-sided confidence 
 
Figure 6.2: Representation of Value at Risk 
interval:Pr [∆P(N) < -VaR] = 1-c  Where c is the confidence level, and ∆P(N) = ∆Pt 
(N) is the relative change in the portfolio value ( P&L) over the time horizon N.  
∆Pt (N) = P(t + N) - Pt . P(t + N) is the natural logarithm of the portfolio value at 
time t + N and Pt is the natural logarithm of the portfolio value at time t. Statistically, 
equation (6.1) means that VaR values are obtained directly from the probability 
distribution of P&L as follows, 
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Where F[∆P(.)] is the cumulative distribution function of the trading revenues, ∆P, 
and f(∆P(.)) is the probability density function of  ∆P. 
6.3 VaR Conversion across Time Horizons and Confidence Levels 
At a confidence level of 99%, a one day VaR is a one day loss that is predicted to be 
exceeded in only one trading day out of 100 trading days. A 99% two weeks VaR is 
a two weeks loss that will be exceeded approximately once every 4 years. By the 
same way, a 99% three months VaR is a three months loss that will be exceeded once 
every 25 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
Here we have to be sure that absolute values of VaR has following characteristics, 
VaR1 day < VaR2weeks<VaR3 Months, and so on.  
For confidence level calculations confidence VaR can be easily calculated via 
normality assumption. If we try to express a 99% confidence level VaR via a 95% 
confidence level VaR then following equation has to be used.  
 
 
 
 
Where 2.326 and 1.645 (known as α’s) are the standard normal deviate 
corresponding to a 99% and 95% confidence level. In the same way, the three 
months 99% confidence level VaR can be expressed via one day, two weeks or any 
horizon length. VaR at any confidence level can be calculated as follows: 
 
weeksweeksMonths
daydayMonths
daydayweeks
VaRVaRVaR
VaRVaRVaR
VaRVaRVaR
223
113
112
51.2
10
63
93.763
16.310
≈=
≈=
≈=
%95%95%99 41.1645.1
326.2 VaRVaRVaR ≈= (6.5) 
(6.4) 
(6.3) 
(6.2) 
 78 
 
 
 
Here may be most important thing to say is this method is mostly applicable where 
we suppose that the standard deviation of trading revenues is constant. 
6.4 VaR Users and VaR in Regulations 
VaR may be seen as very recent development of market risk measurement actually it 
is, but became very widespread after discovery of method. First users of Value at 
Risk method emerged in late 1980’s. According to literature VaR method was 
introduced to financial system by JP Morgan to via its RiskMetricsTM system in 
1994. VaR is now used by most of derivatives’ dealers, even small financial firms, 
non-financial corporations, institutional investors and central banks. After the 
development of VaR tools, regulators become more interested in VaR applications, 
especially after the consecutive financial disasters during the late 1980’s and 1990’s. 
Basle Committee also tries to force usage of VaR models in order to measure risks of 
the financial institutions and also forces to use VaR as a decision making tool [8]. 
The Securities and Exchange Commissions requires U.S. companies to disclose 
quantitative measures of market risk, with VaR listed as one of three possible market 
risk disclosure measures. 
6.5 Components of VaR Measures 
In order to use VaR models we must have an idea about distribution of the financial 
firm’s profit and loss figures. In order to see distribution of P&L we need to collect 
data concerning the present portfolio positions or the trading revenues, for a specified 
time interval, which stands for the holding period or the trading horizon. We must 
construct a model to forecast the distribution of the P&L of the portfolio as a 
function of the market parameters. The last step means that we need to infer the 
cumulative distribution function or the probability density function. As we will see 
later, VaR methodologies are fully different in the ways of constructing probability 
density functions. 
weeksweeksMonths
daydayMonths
VaRVaRVaR
VaRVaRVaR
2%,952%,953%,99
1%,951%,953%,99
54.3
10645.1
63326.2
19.11
645.1
63326.2
≈=
≈= (6.6) 
(6.7) 
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Generally, VaR for any trading portfolio depends on its excellence on the following 
components: 
1. The distribution assumption 
2. Volatility and covariance estimates 
3. The window length of the data used for parameter estimates 
4. Time horizon or the holding period 
5. Confidence level 
In addition to the above components which suppose the mean of return zero, some 
VaR measures as Jackson, Maude and Perraudin (1997) include the mean of return in 
VaR analysis. However, their results show no evidence for any convinced differences 
when the mean of returns assumed to be zero [9]. 
6.5.1 The Distribution Assumption 
As said before, VaR methods are differ mainly from their ways in which they 
construct the pdf. Usually, VaR techniques estimate the cdf’s in three extensive 
methods: the parametric method or analytical models, historical simulation or the 
empirical based methods and the Monte Carlo simulation or stochastic simulation 
method. The last two methods are called as non-parametric approaches.  
6.5.2 Volatility and Covariance Estimates 
Estimating actual volatility of current risk factors is a mandatory component of VaR 
model. However as the portfolio becomes more complex, VaR calculations involves 
estimation for the variance-covariance matrix and the correlation matrix, this is 
known as variance covariance VaR method. As can be seen statements above 
increasing number of positions makes calculations more difficult.  
General VaR models used widely in finance sector assumes constant volatility in 
calculating VaR figures but it is also known that, volatility of financial data is not 
constant, therefore combining volatility updating models with standard VaR models 
become a must for financial institutions. 
In order to employ volatility updating in VaR models researchers have discovered 
many different methods. To account for volatility updating, researchers in VaR use 
different models. Some of them employ a uniform exponential weighting volatility 
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model. While others use asset-specific exponential weighting volatility models. 
These models generally give higher tail probabilities. This researchers show that 
there is a trade off between the degree of approximating time-varying volatility and 
VaR predictions. A study shows that there is a negative relationship between size of 
the parameters of the exponential weighting volatility model and the variability of 
VaR measurements. This means as we increase the risk factors which are subject to 
volatility updating model’s performance decreases [10].  
Other models which tries to model volatility in volatility of risk factors known as 
ARCH models, GARCH models, EGARCH models, extreme value theorem EVT 
and implied volatilities from option prices. These models show that VaR models that 
depend on GARCH estimation for volatility bound the actual daily losses in banks’ 
portfolios closer than internal VaR models used by banks. Many studies perform on 
comparison of volatility updating models but the results shows that every model has 
own advantages and disadvantages. Therefore decision of model choice is a vital part 
of VaR modeling.  
VaR predictions for portfolios that hold many positions require estimating the 
correlation matrix alongside the covariance matrix. Beder (1995) finds that VaR are 
sensitive to correlation assumptions. She calculated VaR for a portfolio under 
different assumptions of the correlation matrix. Her consequences show major 
differences of VaR estimates under those different assumptions of correlation matrix. 
6.5.3 The Window Length 
The window length defined as length of the data that is used in VaR calculations. 
Data length depends on many parameters but main parameter of the length is data 
availability. The Basle committee suggests 250 day (on year) window length.  
Beder (1995) tries to estimate VaR applying historical simulation method with using 
100 day and 250 day window lengths. Study showed that success rate of VaR 
estimates increases with longer estimation data sets. Additional VaR studies made by 
different researchers such as Hendricks used VaR measures using the parametric 
approach with equally weighted volatility models and the historical simulation 
approach. Hendricks used diverse window lengths ranging from 50 days to 1250 
days. He says that VaR measures become steadier for longer observation periods. 
Jackson, Mauder and Perraudin arrive at to the same conclusion of Hendricks by 
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computing parametric and simulation VaRs for 1-day and 10 day time horizons using 
window lengths from three to 24 months. All of the studies reach same conclusion 
meaning: VaR predictions based on longer data windows are more stable and reliable 
[11]. 
6.5.4 The Holding Period and Confidence Level 
The holding period or the time horizon in VaR analysis can be any trading interval. 
The time horizon generally set by regulations and may differ from one day to two 
weeks. (10 trading days). The choice mainly depends on liquidity of assets and 
trading frequencies of portfolio elements. A basic assumption of VaR models says 
that the portfolio remains unchanged over the time horizon therefore P&L of the 
portfolio does not affected by portfolio’s volume changes. The Basle Committee 
recommends 10-day holding period. Many banks use one day holding periods in their 
VaR calculations. Long holding periods are usually recommended for portfolios with 
illiquid instruments. 
Some studies tries to investigate relationship between time horizon and VaR 
accuracy a study has showed that longer trading horizons gives higher VaR values. 
The confidence level, on the other hand, reflects some internal measures of the 
financial institution. Some institutions uses 95% confidence levels while Basle 
committee recommends 99 % confidence level. Committee choice of 99% 
confidence level can be seen as a reflection of the tradeoff between the desire of 
regulators to ensure a safe and sound financial system and the adverse effect of 
capital requirements.  
6.5.5 Basle Committee Parameters 
As mentioned above, Basle Committee wants financial institutions to calculate its 
VaR models at a 99% confidence level and 10-business-days horizon. The resulting 
VaR then multiplied by a safety factor, K, equal 3 to give the minimum capital 
requirement for regulatory purposes. Many financial foundations says that 10 day 
holding period is a too long holding period for calculations and tries to force the 
committee to shorten its holding period assumptions. However, Jorion (2001) 
suggests that the choice of the 10-trading-day period reflects the trade off between 
the cost of frequent monitoring and the benefits of early detection of potential 
problems. According to Basle criteria, a 2 weeks loss value more than VaR would 
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occur once every 4 years. Jorion also says that safety factor can be seen as a fuse for 
model defects. Model defects include underestimation of VaR numbers because of 
inaccuracy of VaR components’ choice. Stahl (1997) justifies the choice of the safety 
factor to be 3 based on Chebyshev’s inequality. Other authors link the choice of the 
number 3 to the kurtosis of the normal distribution, but this sounds a little 
indefensible. 
6.6 VaR Methods 
VaR generally represents a family which consists of different methods. Basically 
these methods can be divided into two main classes, parametric ones and non-
parametric ones. 
6.6.1 Parametric Methods 
In the parametric approach the modeler have to make an assumption on distribution 
of P&L of the portfolio. According to assumption P&L may have normal 
distribution, Gamma distribution, Student t-distribution or any other distribution or a 
mixture of any set of distributions. Other parametric methods comprise a 
linearization and quadratic guess of portfolios’ value. VaR estimates derived by this 
method appear as a function of the parameters of the assumed distribution, and that is 
why it is called parametric [12]. 
Parametric methods are exposed to some kind of inaccuracy. This defaults mainly 
come from distribution assumption. For example, if the VaR method assumes the 
P&L to have a multivariate normal distribution (as frequently assumed) whereas the 
actual data shows excess kurtosis, resulted VaR estimate underestimates the 
maximum potential losses at high confidence levels [13]. Under the parametric 
method with normality assumption, two VaR approaches are usually used: the 
variance covariance approach, and the Greeks approach. Both of those approaches 
keep the normality assumption of risk factors underlying portfolio returns. While the 
variance covariance approach assumes a linear relationship between portfolio returns 
and the underlying risk factors, the Greeks approach deals with nonlinear events as in 
the case of option portfolios and fixed income portfolios. 
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6.6.1.1 Variance Covariance 
May be the most popular approach employing in VaR is the variance covariance 
method [14]. This method assumes all risk factors have normal distribution and the 
total portfolio is linear combination of all these normally distributed portfolio 
members. Therefore the P&L distribution of total portfolio is also normally 
distributed. Under these assumptions VaR calculation becomes easy to handle. VaR 
principally is a multiple of the portfolio standard deviation, and the standard 
deviation is a linear function of individual volatilities and covariances of the 
underlying market risk factors. Therefore, all we need to calculate VaR is the 
variance covariance matrix and information about the sizes of individual positions to 
determine the portfolio standard deviation. After that we multiply this standard 
deviation by a confidence level parameter and scale variable reflecting the size of the 
portfolio, this approach can be defined via matrix notations as follows, 
 
[ ] [ ]TTpp VaRVaRPwwPVaR **21 ραασ =−=−= ∑    (6.8) 
 
Here α is the standard normal deviate matching to a specific confidence level. σP is 
the standard deviation of the portfolio, P the scale variable reflecting the size of the 
portfolio. w represents n x 1 vector of sizes of individual positions in the portfolio. ρ 
is the correlation matrix of positions present in the portfolio and VaR represents n x 
1 vector of individual positions’ VaRs (undiversified VaRs), where VaR for 
individual positions is -ασW and W is a scaling variable reflects the initial value of 
individual positions [15]. 
However, the variance covariance approach to VaR does not always robust to actual 
financial institutions’ portfolios. Portfolio returns may be nonlinear in risk factors, as 
in the case when the portfolio contains positions in options or fixed-income 
instruments. In response to non-linearity, modelers use the Taylor series expansion or 
linear approximation 
6.6.1.2 The Greeks Methods 
The Greeks methods come mainly from the sensitivity parameters of option prices to 
different risk factors underlying an option portfolio. Assume the value of the 
 84 
portfolio depends on the value of the underlying asset, and remaining time to 
maturity, such that P=P(S,t). Taking Taylor series expansion or alternatively 
applying Ito’s Lemma to get the progression for dynamics in the portfolio worth, we 
obtain: 
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As can be seen that all higher order of change in t goes to zero, thus the last term in 
the right-side of equation goes to zero. The first part in the right side of is defined as 
delta of the portfolio, ∆ , which means the change of the portfolio value with respect 
to the change in the price of the underlying asset. The second term is gamma of the 
portfolio, Γ , which is the second derivative of the value of the portfolio with respect 
to the underlying asset price (first derivative of delta to underlying asset price). The 
third term, known as theta, Θ , is the change of the value of the portfolio with respect 
to time to maturity. 
 
dtdSdSdP Θ+Γ+∆= 2
2
1
       (6.10) 
 
The easiest approach is generally known delta-normal approach. Delta –normal 
approach implies first order Taylor series expansion of a portfolio’s value with 
respect to stock returns according to its definition. In this case we ignore the second 
and the third argument in the equation stated above meaning we ignore Γ and Θ. 
After that we calculate potential loss of the portfolio as dP =∆ dS which occupies 
likely change in prices. This relationship is linear and the worst loss in P is related 
with an extreme value of S. When the distribution of dS is normal the portfolio VaR, 
VaRP, will be a product of the sensitivity parameter ∆ and the VaRS of the underlying 
asset as: 
 
0SxVaRVaR SP ασ∆=∆       (6.11) 
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For fixed income securities the underlying asset’s risk factor is the yield, and the first 
order Taylor series expansion will be a function of the yield, and the constant in this 
case is the modified duration, as follows: 
 
dP=-DPdy         (6.12) 
 
Here, D is the modified duration of regarding risk factor and y is the yield.  
Delta-normal approach supplies the linear normality and VaR estimation becomes 
easier. However, this simple approximation causes incorrect VaR estimate. Therefore 
many authors argues that this approach would produce reliable estimate for VaR for 
small holding periods or/and when the portfolio has few option positions. 
To get more precise VaR for non-linear positions (options and fixed income), some 
authors apply the quadratic model or the second Taylor series expansion known as 
delta- gamma approaches. In terms of equation (6-1), we include the second term that 
includes Γ . Then the change in the portfolio value that includes positions in option 
would be 2
2
1 dSdSdP Γ+∆= . Gamma is the first derivative of delta with respect to 
underlying asset price [16]. It measures the curvature of the connection between the 
portfolio value and the underlying market variable. A non-zero gamma means 
skewness in the distribution of P&L of the portfolio. When gamma is positive 
(negative), changes in the portfolio value is positively (negatively) skewed. 
For a portfolio with fixed income positions, we can see the relationship between 
portfolio value and its yield as follows: 
 
2
2
1 CVdyDPdydP +−=        (6.13) 
 
Here the coefficient C is the convexity parameter and it is equivalent to Γ 
The task now is to deal with dS and dS2 for option portfolios or dy and dy2 for fixed 
income portfolios. Authors deal with those terms by taking the variance for the both 
sides of the quadratic approximation. This is what is called delta-gamma method 
[17]. If dS is normally distributed then all odd moments will be zero. And with the 
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assumption that dS and dS2 are jointly normally distributed then dP is normally 
distributed and then VaR can be calculated directly. 
Some authors employ a different method to understand VaR estimates based on delta 
gamma approximation. In his method known as delta-gamma-Monte Carlo, They 
firstly generate a random simulation of the risk factor S. Then he uses the Taylor 
approximation to produce simulated movement in the option value. VaR in this case 
can be predicted from the experimental distribution of the portfolio value. Other 
modifications of delta-gamma methods include delta-gamma-minimization which 
suggested by Wilson and Fallon. 
Some authors made some developments to improve delta-gamma method by 
employing Cornish-Fisher expansion which deals with skewness. In the method 
standart normal deviate of the distribution α is replaced by ( )γααα 1
6
1 2
−−=′  here γ 
is the skewness parameter. 
Many authors agree that this delta-gamma approach tremendously increases 
correctness of VaR predictions. However this Greeks method also assumes normality 
of finance data which is still a strong assumption. Some studies on financial data 
showed that the data does not have normal distribution it tends to be skewed. 
The normality assumption of risk factors or P&L of the portfolio would definitely 
influence VaR predictions since it depends remarkably on the distribution of the tail. 
Thus, if we have thicker (thinner) tail with respect to normal distribution, then VaR 
estimates based on normality would be under- (over-) estimated. Some models show 
that VaR calculated under normality assumption underestimates risk since the 
observed distribution of many financial return series have tails that are flatter than 
those implied by conditional normal distribution. 
Apart from normality assumption we can still employ parametric approach to 
construct Value at Risk. Nevertheless, many researchers use non-parametric 
approach (the simulation approach) to deal with non-normality. In the parametric 
approach, another distribution is explicitly assumed instead of the normal 
distribution, and based on this assumed distribution; a formula to describe the 
confidence interval is analytically derived. 
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In the non-parametric approach (Simulation), no exact distribution assumption is 
wanted. VaR is deriving from the standard theory of order statistics, as in Kupic 
(1995), or from Monte Carlo simulations, where VaR is calculated from multiple 
runs that might be representative of the possible market price outcomes. In some 
cases, actual historical return allocation is used by bootstrapping rather than 
simulations. 
6.6.1.3 Analytical VaR Approaches with Deviation from Normality 
Generally, the parametric approach for VaR estimates with non-normal distribution 
classes aims at modifying for kurtosis since VaR estimates depend on the distribution 
of the left tail. A probability distribution with fat tails has greater probability mass 
out in the tails of the distribution, where large price movement occurs compared with 
the normal distribution. Accordingly, VaR estimates tend to under or over estimate 
risk if the normal distribution is assumed [18]. 
Fat tails in actual finance data results from stochastic unpredictability of the 
underlying market factor (like stock returns). The dimension of the “tail fatness” 
depends on the correlation between volatility of returns and returns’ themselves. 
However, some authors says that actual market data are typically found to have 
flatter tails compared with that would come from stochastic volatility alone.  
An additional basis of fat tails in the distribution of financial data comes from price 
jumps, New evidences discover that stochastic volatility and jumps are both 
important in explaining the dynamics of stock returns for different frequencies. 
Chenov, Gallant, Ghysels and Tauchen find that non-affine jumps and stochastic 
volatility are important in finance time series data.  
6.6.2 Non-Parametric Approaches 
As we mentioned earlier, an essential part on VaR estimation is the probability 
density function. Non-parametric approaches suppose the P&L distribution directly 
from the standard theory of order statistics, with no need for pre-assumption about 
the distribution. The next two sections look at the two non-parametric approaches 
and the recent developments on those approaches 
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6.6.2.1 Historical Simulation 
This method is the most naïve approach to calculate VaR. Typically it has no main 
assumptions about the distribution of trading revenues. As a substitute, the 
distribution is built from the historical behavior of the portfolio P&L. Here the 
current portfolio ran according to actual changes in the market factors during the 
past. The only assumption that is made in this method is that the past trends of profits 
and losses will continue in the future [9]. An advantage of this method is that it is 
free from any estimating inaccuracy.  
On the other hand there is a trade off between length of the data used in historical 
simulation and the accuracy or relevancy of simulation results. Because we try to 
have more historical data to catch heavy daily loses but this causes our data to be 
more different than current one.  
In order to reduce this effect researchers have tried to discover new methods. After 
that bootstrapped historical simulation method was developed. Here returns of risk 
factors are generated by bootstrapping from historical observations. By this 
approach, volatilities and correlations are updated rather than estimated from old data 
[19].  
Butler and Schachter (1996, 1998) propose combining the historical simulation with 
the kernel estimation. They carry out this mixture in three steps: at the start they 
estimate the pdf and the cdf of portfolio returns. After that, they approximate the 
distribution of the order statistics corresponding to the confidence level. In the final 
step, they guess VaR using the first and the second moments of the pdf for the order 
statistics determined by (1-c)th quantile. This alteration lets us to estimate the 
precision of VaR estimate and to construct confidence intervals around them.  
Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1998) make special modification to the 
historical simulation method. They mix the historical simulation method with 
exponential smoothing. Principally, this method connects exponentially declining 
weights to historical portfolio returns starting from current time and going back. The 
future returns are calculated from past returns and sorted in increasing order (regular 
historical approach). After that, VaR guess is computed from the experiential density 
function. This alteration is know as hybrid approach, and it also ties to overcome the 
problem of using past information by highlighting the most recent observations. One 
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advantage of this method is that it takes into account time varying volatility and it is 
suitable for fat-tailed series.  
Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1998) make the hybrid approach to a diverse 
financial series and evaluated the results with exponential smoothing and plain 
vanilla historical simulations. Results for 99% confidence level VaR, applied to the 
S&P 500, show a reduction in the absolute error estimation ranging from 30%-40% 
compared with the exponential smoothing method. The improvement over the 
historical simulation was less clear. The absolute error reduced by 14%-28% 
compared with the historical simulation. Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw 
(1998) say that hybrid approach works better for exchange rate portfolios and heavy-
tailed series.  
6.6.2.2 Monte Carlo Simulation 
The Monte Carlo simulation approach may be the most widely used one of VaR 
calculation methods. This method generally used by sophisticated and experienced 
risk managers. At first look, it has some similarities with historical simulation 
approach. Both of them tries to estimate portfolios values from historical data, 
however Monte Carlo simulation generates new portfolio paths instead of applying 
historical ones. Monte Carlo simulations provide N possible portfolio values on a 
given future date (t + N). The VaR value can be determined from the distribution of 
simulated portfolio values. 
In order to perform Monte Carlo simulation we must first define stochastic processes 
and process parameters which calculates risk factors. Here, important thing is 
selected procedure should grasp risk factors movements well. Theoretical price 
changes are attained by simulations drawn from the specified distribution. At the 
end, we obtain asset prices at time t + N from the simulated price trajectories and 
compute the portfolio value and VaR. One main difficulty of this method is that it 
takes long time to converge. 
Main modifications of Monte Carlo models are done in order to improve time 
efficiency of models. Because when we want to increase accuracy of the model we 
have to run more simulations. Wiener (1997) reports that in order to increase the 
precision by a factor of 10, you must perform 100 times more simulations. 
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Some authors used n quasi-Monte Carlo idea to get quicker valuation financial 
derivatives and perform it to VaR estimates. After these studies, application of the 
quasi-Monte Carlo method noticeably improve the convergence of the simulation 
compared with the traditional Monte Carlo method with the same level of accuracy. 
In 1996 Pritsker made two suggestions on Monte Carlo techniques. The first one 
known as grid Monte Carlo approach and the other one is the modified grid Monte 
Carlo. In the first suggestion, he makes network of changes in the risk factors. Then 
he computes the portfolio values at each node of the gird. The probable realizations 
of the grid are obtained from random drawings from pre-decided models. Portfolio 
values for new draws are approximated by interpolating portfolio values at adjacent 
grid points. However, this method is subject to a problem Pritsker (1996) call it 
dimensionality problem. 
In order to eliminate the dimensionality problem, in the Monte Carlo approach, He 
tried to lower dimension of the grid by grouping risk factors. After grouping them he 
consolidated them via Taylor expansion. This modifications main assumption is the 
portfolio is formed by two types of factors, linear and non-linear. Moreover each 
type of element has to be estimated via particular method. Changes in the value 
according to linear factors are evaluated by linear approximation. Here changes in 
the portfolio values that are resulted from non-linear factors are estimated through 
grid points. Pritsker (1996) find that the modified gird Monte Carlo method involves 
the level of accuracy close to delta-gamma Monte-Carlo approach. However, delta-
gamma Monte-Carlo requires less computational time. Gibson and Pritsker (2000) 
expand the modified gird technique to portfolios hold positions in fixed income 
securities. 
6.6.3 Comparison among Different Methods 
Different application of VaR methods produces different VaR estimates. The results 
of the applications sometimes give similar results but sometimes there may be huge 
differences occur between them. Usually the choice of the technique depends on the 
components of the portfolio. 
VaR methods always compared among each other concerning numerous 
considerations. The first is the capability to capture risk factors underlying portfolio 
returns, with the hypothesis that the portfolio includes positions in options and fixed 
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income securities. The second concern is the easiness of implementation. The third is 
how fast according to computation time. Other concerns that are generally taken into 
consideration are the easiness to explain to senior management. Table 6.1 contains a 
brief summary of comparisons among different traditional methods. However, the 
most important comparison among different methods includes the tradeoff between 
the accuracy of the estimate and the cost of implementing computations in terms of 
time and the easiness of implementation. 
Each of the methods has advantages and disadvantages. Variance –covariance 
method become too complex to handle when portfolio have different risk factors 
since we have to calculate standard deviations and correlations of each risk factor. 
Additionally correlation and covariance matrixes become more complex as the 
number of risk factors increases. When we turn the Monte Carlo simulation 
approach, we must make a choice between run length and accuracy of model. One 
advantage for the Monte Carlo simulation is that it can be done under different 
assumptions, which is not offered in other methods. However, the Monte Carlo 
simulation method subjects to the model risk and measurement error. Monte Carlo 
simulation method models risk factors according to a pre-assumed stochastic process 
and this pre-assumed stochastic process might be incorrect. Measurement errors 
engage in all VaR predictions, because the true parameters should be estimated. 
Pearson and Simthson give Figure 6.3 for comparison. The figure illustrates that the 
full Monte Carlo method is the most precise and the most time consuming method. 
Delta normal on the other side is the least precise [20]. We see also that delta-gamma 
Monte Carlo outperforms the modified gird Monte Carlo. In the same time, delta-
gamma-delta outperforms delta-gamma minimization. Generally speaking, delta-
gamma Monte Carlo is the best among the quadratic approximation methods in terms 
of comparing accuracy and speed of computation 
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Full Monte Carlo 
Modified Grid Monte 
Carlo 
Delta-Gamma Monte 
Carlo 
Delta-Gamma Delta 
Delta Normal 
Delta Gamma 
Minimization 
Computation Speed 
Accuracy 
Figure 6.3: Correctness of VaR Methods against Computation Speed  
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The table below shows the advantages and disadvantages of different VaR methods. 
Table 6.1: The advantages and disadvantages of different VaR methods 
Method 
Factor 
Variance-
Covariance 
Quadratic 
Approximations 
Historical 
Simulation 
Monte Carlo 
Simulation 
Ability to capture risk 
Factors for position 
with 
nonlinear dependence 
on 
risk factors 
Ineffective at all 
 
Can handle it, but the 
accuracy diminishes 
with their existence. 
VaR value understated. 
 
Effective 
 
Effective 
 
Assumptions Impose normal 
Distribution 
assumption 
Impose normal 
distribution assumption 
Past trends 
continue in 
the future 
Impose stochastic 
model 
for risk factors 
Accounting for thick 
tails 
No No Yes, if the past 
data imply it 
Yes, if the modeled 
risk imply it 
Accuracy Inaccurate with thick 
tails data and when 
recent past is 
anomalous 
Inaccurate with thick 
tails data and when 
recent past is anomalous 
Future might have 
extreme events, or 
the 
opposite 
Misleading when the 
past 
is anomalous 
Easiness of 
implementation 
Yes, when the 
number 
of positions in the 
portfolio is limited, 
difficult with large 
number of positions 
Yes, with the availability 
of data and few number 
of position 
Yes, with the 
availability of data 
Yes, with complex 
software 
Quickness of 
computation 
Relatively quick, 
depending on the 
number of positions 
Relatively quick, 
depending on the 
number of positions 
 
Relatively quick Time consuming, 
tradeoff 
between computation 
time and accuracy 
Easy to explain to 
senior 
management 
No No Yes No 
Performed under 
different 
assumption 
No No No Yes 
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6.7 Back Testing 
The Basle Standard requires financial institutions to carry out back testing for its 
internal VaR models. Back testing is a subsequent procedure in which the financial 
institution checks how often actual losses have exceeded the level predicted by VaR. 
A financial institution that perform daily VaR over a 99% confidence level should 
not observe more than 1% cases of losses exceeds VaR. For 250 days trading period, 
the financial institution should notice that actual losses during that period exceeded 
VaR estimate only by 3 times. 
Basle Standard calculates the market risk capital requirement at time t by: 
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Where Ct is the market risk capital requirement at time t. At is a multiplication factor 
ranging between three and four. SRt is the capital specific risk. 
The capital specific risk is element of the market risk. The new capital requirements 
consider market risk in two main dimensions, general market risk and specific risk. 
The general market risk comes from changes in overall market factors such as 
security prices, commodity prices, exchange rates and interest rates. Specific risk is 
the risk from changes in prices of assets for non-market reasons. 
In equation, the value of At depends on the accuracy of the internal VaR model 
during the past periods, say past trading year. Basle committee has divided number 
of violations into three main zones. They are green, yellow and red zones. According 
to Basle Criteria if model has 4 or less exceptional days within last 250 workday the 
model is in green zone and capital requirement of the model is 3. The yellow zone 
represent a mode with more then 4 and less then 10 defaults within last year and 
capital requirement factor takes a value between 3 and 4. Finally if the model has 
more than 9 defaults within last year the model is in red zone and should be revised.  
Wiener (1997) disagree that this process prevents banks from setting low levels of 
VaR, and with enough capital reserve safety, banks may only set upper bound level 
for VaR rather than precise value. 
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6.8 Stress Testing (Scenario Analysis) 
As can be seen from previous information given above, VaR can be defined as worst 
normal loss for next trading day within given time interval. According to this, VaR is 
just a normal loss that occurs with respect to normal market conditions. However, 
this measure cannot give answers to following question on a bad day what is the 
worst level of loss. 
Stress testing may be the unique method for answering this question and definitely 
this is not a VaR method. In general it tries to evaluate portfolio value under different 
bad day scenarios. There is no standard way to make stress testing, and no standard 
set of scenarios to consider. The process depends significantly on the decision and 
knowledge of the risk manager. 
Generally Stress testing starts with setting hypothetical price movements so called 
scenarios. These scenarios can be created in terms of standard deviation movements. 
This movement can come from actual extreme events. For example, the scenarios 
might be based upon the extreme movements of the U.S. equity prices that happened 
on October 19, 1987 when the S&P 500 moved by 22.3 standard deviations or for a 
less extreme case when the S&P 500 moved by 6.8 standard deviations on January 8, 
1988. 
For fixed income securities portfolio, we can use the changes in US dollar interest 
rates and bond prices experienced during the winter and spring of 1994. For foreign 
exchange rate we can use the changes in some of the European exchange rates that 
occurred in September 1992, Generally speaking for Turkey March 2003 “Tezkere” 
crisis mainly used as worst case scenario for fixed income instruments.  
6.9 Conclusion 
Basically VaR models give estimation for the worst loss for a portfolio for 
predefined time horizon. During calculation of VaR, loses are calculated by the left 
tail quantile from distribution of portfolio returns. Therefore, basically VaR 
estimations depend on the left tail distribution of profit and loss account. As 
described before sections generally profit and loss of as given portfolio does not 
follow normal distribution especially in volatile market circumstances, additionally 
they suffers fat tails and excess kurtosis. Khindanova and Rachev (2000) say that 
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neither the traditional methods of VaR nor its improvements do give adequate and 
mutual estimation for VaR that captures the above properties of real financial data. 
According to historical results, the variance covariance method and the Greeks 
approximations can not deal with the observed thick tail aspect with financial data. 
The historical techniques are not trustworthy especially in estimating low quantiles. 
If we decided to use Monte Carlo simulation instead of parametric approaches, we 
still have the same assumption which implies risk factors are normally or log-
normally distributed, this situation requires stochastic modeling as well. 
Berkowitz and O’Brien compare the accuracy of the daily VaR models used by the 
largest six U.S banks which are used in predicting actual daily losses during the 
period January 1998 to March 2000 [2]. The study shows that none of the models 
produces reliable estimates for P&L of the bank. Jorion (2002), on the other hand, 
examines the worth of VaR disclosures in quarterly and annually reports for the 
largest eight U.S. Banks. He says that published VaR estimates reveal the actual 
quarterly P&L for those banks. On the other hand he also concludes that these VaR 
models are not successful in determining actual losses of Bank. 
Of course the researchers does not give bank’s names on their studies, but if we 
examine the quarterly reports of US major bank we can find the names of the banks 
and which bank use which method. For example Bank of New York reports that they 
use Monte Carlo simulations. Bankers Trust use proprietary simulations, JP Morgan 
Chase & Co. use historical simulations, CitiCorp covariance matrix, and Bank of 
America describe its method as “sophisticated techniques”. These methods are 
revealed in the quarterly reports. Therefore we can conclude that none of those 
methods could predict the Banks’ losses especially in the second half of 1998. 
After that, additional studies which use regression analysis between the unpredictable 
P&L and daily volatility concluded that quarterly reports of banks’ are applicable. 
However for some authors, these results are questionable since they use quarterly 
VaR over a 99% confidence level. According to this VaR specification, we anticipate 
to see that a three months loss exceeding VaR occurs once every 25 years, and any 
violations should be tested along 25 years or 100 quarters period. However, in order 
to perform this kind of study we have not enough data.  
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The conclusion from those works is that none of the VaR methods could predict the 
actual banks’ losses even with inclusion of time varying volatility. Berkowitz and 
O’Brien find that VaR estimates that GARCH models for volatility bound actual 
daily losses in banks’ portfolios closer than internal VaR models. However, even 
those models could not describe actual portfolio dynamics during the periods of the 
Russian crises and the near collapse of the LTCM in August and September 1998 [2]. 
Generally, elimination effort for thick tails may increase the performance of VaR 
predictions. However, VaR estimates that diverge from normality assumption in an 
attempt to account for thick tails do not consider for the following aspects: 
1: The full kurtosis cannot be monitored completely by time varying volatility alone 
or jumps (event risk) alone. In study done by Gibson (2001) he says “what is needed 
is a model that can combine time varying volatility with event risk” and he found that 
job is challenging. Likewise, Lewis (2002) says that mixing the stochastic volatility 
with jumps gives much better fit to both real stock price distributions with their wide 
tails and smile paths. On the other hand, he believes this as a hard job but it deserves 
trying for the benefit of getting more accurate modeling of financial data. Other 
researchers also made several studies on this subject and they find that, both 
stochastic volatility and jumps are important in their estimations for mixed stock 
returns processes. Those studies even use a non-affine stochastic process and jump-
diffusion process. 
2: As Airoldi (2001) proposes, with fat tails, volatility grows and updates quicker. 
The thicker the tail, the quicker the dynamics of volatility. Thus jumps and extreme 
events are sources of hyper growth in volatility. Other authors including report 
similar evidences in their non affine estimations. Accordingly, the assumed linear 
relationship between volatility dynamics and volatility levels would no longer holds 
during jumps and extreme events (fat tails) for this reason a non-linear representation 
of volatility dynamics becomes essential. 
3: When non-linear dynamics engage (even in the case of linear dynamics), point 2 
above, restricted densities provide improved description of short term asset price 
movements contrast with the unconditional densities, which has very vital 
implication in risk management. Therefore, the dependence of VaR models on the 
unconditional densities would not give the greatest approximation for VaR when we 
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suppose nonlinear dynamics (or even linear). And we distinguish that there are 
powerful evidences of nonlinear dynamics in short term movements of asset returns 
composition. 
4: Kurtosis has non-flat term structure that differs over time and this extends the 
dependence of VaR estimates on the time horizon. Actually if we assume that 
volatility is time varying this implies that the fatness of tail would be time varying, 
this situations results in some covariance between the confidence level and the VaR 
horizon. 
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7. NORMAL MIXTURE 
In recent years many empirical studies revealed that traditional VaR models are not 
enough to estimate losses of volatile market conditions. On the other hand many 
institutions make stress tests on their portfolios, they generally use hectic adverse 
market fluctuations occurred in the past. However here is another problem, which 
event is a hectic one. In literature many models have been introduced in order to 
solve problem including ARCH-type models, Extreme Value Theory and Stochastic 
Volatility models. 
Here we try to employ a different approach to VaR methods; typically here we try to 
mix two different distributions with same means while they have different covariance 
matrices. Here we mix the observations of two distributions but as expected we give 
higher weights to normal ones. As can be seen in following paragraphs this approach 
can be seen as a solver for following questions: 
 Correct identification of observations 
 Predicting fat tails of VaR 
 Performing stress testing analysis using severe condition scenario. 
7.1 A Model for Asset Returns 
Here we describe a model which shows returns of assets and with employing this 
model we can derive some properties of returns. If we have p assets )....( 1 pYYY =′  
then we can divide them into two subsets [21]. First subset called as core assets 
)...( 11 qYYY =′  and second subset is so called peripheral set and contains 
)...( 12 pq YYY +=′  assets. Then density of the total vector )( 21 YYY ′′=′  can be 
composition of two vectors. As a result density function becomes, 
)()()( )2()1( 21 yfyfyf YYY pipi +=  here 121 =+ pipi and )()( yf iY  is the probability 
density function of i th distribution. In matrix form the expected value and covariance 
matrix of two distributions can be expressed as: 
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Here Ei and Covi(Y) are stands for expectation and covariance matrices for 
corresponding distribution. The expected values of distribution parameters 
)2()1()2()1(
1 ,,,, ∑∑µµpi  can be calculated via EM algorithm. As a product the 
algorithm gives posterior probabilities. ( )ji yτ  
 
 
 
Where ( ))()( )2()1()2()1(1 ′′′′ ∑∑=Θ′ vecvecµµpi  stands for probability which is 
computed from estimates of parameters, in this situation that observation comes from 
ith population. In this notation it is generally called posterior probability of the jth 
observation.  
As a result we can calculate conditional expectation of Y2,.given Y1 in each 
population via following formula: 
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We guess this conditional expectation, when calculated using the (estimated) 
parameters of the high-volatility distribution to reveal the reaction of the minor assets 
according to the volatilities and correlations of the hectic periods. 
7.2 Mixture Models in Risk Management 
Setting adverse periods for Normal Mixture approach is first important question to 
answer. This problem is very important since volatility of risk factors in those 
periods grows tremendously. In particular correlations between alternative 
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investment instruments differ in fluctuation periods as compared with normal 
periods, this phenomenon known as correlation breakdown. According to this 
phenomenon banks generally make their stress tests based on observations from 
adverse periods. Here identifying the worst observations is emerged as a big 
problem. Generally this approach suggests that observations should be generated 
from mixture of good day and bad day scenarios. As a result of this suggestion we 
can conclude that yi  is an hectic observation if and only if ( ) 5.0ˆ;2 >Θjyτ  
After finding parameter estimates for the distribution of profit and loss account, we 
can simply get the fat tails of VaR. Since resulting distribution is mixture of two 
distributions, we can simply find resulting distribution’s parameters arbitrarily. If the 
distribution of data leptokurtic VaR extracted from Monte Carlo simulation process 
from this situation reflects reality. That means tails are larger than normal one. Here 
it is important to say that the resulting distribution still belongs to “Normal” 
observations, but uses adverse condition scenarios in order to address fat tails. 
Another advantage of method is usage of adverse case scenario as stress test. In order 
to make stress test VaR using covariance matrix Σ(2) should be calculated. Resulting 
VaR value represents conclusion of stress test. 
Another way for stress testing is described in the study done by Kim and Finger 
(2000) main idea behind the approach is shocking core assets Y(1) and computing 
movement of the peripheral ones Y(2) as the conditional expectation ( ) )( 1)2(2 YYE .  
7.3 Validation 
(i) Identifying adverse observations:  In order to see that the probabilities give 
accurate results giving right indications about population membership of an 
observation, we made Monte Carlo simulations in order to achieve 500 different 
outcomes and observations come from the mixture: 
 
)(1.0)(9.0)( 21 yfyfyf +=        (7.5) 
 
Where ( ) ( ))1(51 ,0 ∑≈ Nyf  and ( ) ( ))2(52 ,0 ∑≈ Nyf . Σ(1) Σ(2) are given by: 
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Here we get an important result because when we compare this variance covariance 
matices we see that only variances are different, this is the main idea behind the 
normal mixture approach. 
Unlike the multivariate normal case, in the multivariate normal mixture give the 
estimates of the parameter obtained via marginal and full dimensional data are not 
the same. For this reason we show below the estimates obtained five-two and one 
dimensional data. With five dimensional data 
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With two dimensional data the results are: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )943.8435.12ˆ
631.1552.0ˆ
360.0595.0ˆ
111.0026.0ˆ
920.0ˆ
)2(
)1(
)2(
)1(
1
=
′
∑
=
′
∑
−=
−−=
=
′
′
diag
diag
µ
µ
pi
 
With one component we get: 
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Figure 7.1 to 7.3 shown below represents observations of simulated adverse case 
scenarios. At first look first graph seems convincing but second and third ones give 
more information since they includes a few small returns that are generated by high 
volatility distribution. For further investigation a Monte Carlo experiment with mean 
vector ( )66666)2( =′µ  is shown.  
 
Figure 7.1 :   Posterior probability as function of returns – univariate data 
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Figure 7.2 :   Posterior probability as function of returns – bivariate data 
 
Figure 7.3 :   Posterior probability as function of returns –multivariate data 
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Figure 7.4 :   Posterior probability as function of returns – different mean vectors 
As can be seen from the results there is no straight way to determine which data set 
will be used. Studies show that if we use additional marginal distributions, we get 
additional benefits if and only if they provide additional information about separation 
of two populations. As in the case presented above means of the two populations are 
identical their contributions are almost zero.  
In order to use full dimensional approach we have to deal with some computational 
difficulties. When we use the full- dimensional approach we have to run algorithm 
only one time, otherwise in case of bivariate mixtures we have to run the model p(p-
1)/2 times.  
In bivariate approach expected value and standard deviation of a variable is different 
because it depends on which bivariate distribution is used. If we have only three 
variables and we want to calculate expected values and expected standard deviations 
of the variables, we have to get estimates of ( )21 ,cov YY  and ( )31 ,cov YY . For these 
two covariance matrices we get two different estimates for, 1µ  and 21σ , but in this 
case these estimates are not the same and we have no instrument to recognize which 
one is better. For conservatism it is reasonable to take estimation of 21σ as: 
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On the other hand if number of dimensions becomes too large the full dimensional 
method has some difficulties because in this case multicollinearity might come to 
play and algorithm may not converge at this point bivariate approach suggested by 
Kim and Finger can be used but this algorithm has huge computational requirements.  
(ii) VaR: As computation example of Fat tails of VaR, a data set is formed with 
actual data and some simulation results. A 13-dimensional data set is used in NM 
VaR calculations the data set contains both equity and bond positions. In order to 
make comparison easy weights of equities and bonds are set in equal levels.  
In the table shown below we calculated VaR of our portfolio with three approaches 
in four different confidence levels. In the first step we calculate VaR value based on 
adverse case scenario, in which we expect to have largest VaR values from every 
confidence level. In addition to adverse case scenario we calculate our VaR value 
based on our normal market conditions and lastly calculate mixture VaR in order to 
see normal mixture effect. For this last case we simulate 10000 observations and 
results of the study shown below. 
Table 7.1: Comparison of VaR Results of Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To give successfulness of VaR models we should look at the actual losses. Indicating 
with rc the proportion of times the return is smaller than c, we get the results shown 
in table 7.2: 
 
 
 
  VaRhec VaRnorm VaRmix 
95% -1.64 -1.04 -1.05 
98% -2.02 -1.30 -1.45 
99% -2.27 -1.49 -1.75 
99.5% -2.50 -1.65 -2.03 
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Table 7.2: Comparison of Backtests  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the study show that standard normal VaR approach generally 
underestimates actual P&L account of the firm, but if we look at Normal Mixture 
VaR results, they are more conservative than traditional VaR approach and gives 
better estimates. Finally, the adverse scenario produces highest loss results but this 
time overestimates risk. The following figure represents VaR estimates of these 3 
different distributions. 
 
Figure 7.5 : VaR Estimates of Scenarios   
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The same simulation model has been run again 10000 times but in this case we use 5 
equally weighted portfolio elements we obtain following results, in table 7.3 VaR 
results are presented and table 4 represents actual P&L of the portfolio. These results 
also show normal mixture VaR represents actual conditions. 
Table 7.3: VaR Results of Scenerios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.4: Actual P&L 
 
 
 
 
 
  VaRhec VaRnorm VaRmix 
95% -1.96 -0.85 -0.76 
98% -2.47 -1.05 -1.08 
99% -2.79 -1.21 -1.55 
99.50% -3 -1.35 -2.02 
r-1.96 r-0.85 r-0.76 
0.52% 3.68% 4.76% 
r-2.47 r-1.05 r-1.08 
0.19% 2.19% 2.04% 
r-2.79 r-1.21 r-1.55 
0.12% 1.62% 1.08% 
r-3 r-1.35 r-2.02 
0.08% 1.31% 0.49% 
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8. NORMAL MIXTURE APPLICATION 
Basle II requirements have forced the banks to develop their own risk management 
tools and gradually all of the banks become interested in developing and/or 
outsourcing risk management systems. As a trading risk management and 
measurement system generally VaR family is widely used in banking sector since the 
VaR family is relatively cheap, easy, and fast to implement with respect to Extreme 
Value Theory. 
A typical trading risk measurement system has to contain following basic elements: 
1. Data feeding 
2. Yield curve formation 
3. Correlation and standard deviation calculation 
4. Portfolio formation 
5. Mapping and stripping 
6. VaR calculation 
7. Kurtosis adjustment (If present) 
8. Limit Setting 
9. Other Aspects 
All of the basic elements stated above their own difficulties and have to be handled 
according to their nature and availability. 
8.1 Data Feeding 
Data feeding maybe the most important part of the risk management system since if 
the system is fed by wrong or inadequate data the VaR calculation gives inaccurate 
results. Currently data providers give many different types of outputs to banks and 
selection of suitable data provider becomes more difficult day by day. 
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Today many data providers for example Reuters, Bloomberg and Superderivatives 
give online data to banks and other financial institutions. These data providers afford 
many different types of data packages and their prices are different as well. At this 
point selection of right data providing package is very important because of limited 
budgets that are allocated to risk management departments. 
Another dimension of data feeding is integrity, meaning getting the data from data 
provider to risk management system. Since not all the banks has integrated risk 
management systems today, many risk management activities are done on 
spreadsheets. Therefore data provider should send its data directly to excel or some 
other type of spreadsheet. 
In order to deal with budget constraints and integrity problems data provider Reuters 
has been selected for getting real time data since the software is widely used in 
finance sector as a benchmark and it can directly feed data to Microsoft Excel. 
The bank has several trading positions, including new Turkish lira bonds, Eurobonds 
issued by Turkish government, foreign exchange positions and finally option 
positions. If natures of these instruments are analyzed we see following unique 
characteristics: 
New Turkish lira bonds can be both coupon bonds and discount bonds and they can 
be sold in both over the counter markets, IMKB stock exchange or interbank 
markets. First and third market data cannot be found since these markets are 
confidential and the counterparties do not want to show their own buy and sell rates 
to the market but as a cost they take the counterparty risk. However the second 
market is open the public and the transaction rates and volumes can be tracked by 
outside investors, but here counterparties cannot hide their positions but they do not 
take counterparty risk. The exchange market takes counterparty risk and act as a 
cleaning house.  
In order to achieve accurate data, the bank decided to take daily transaction report of 
IMKB bond desk and tries to figure out actual interest rates. The report is 
downloaded at the end of every workday and put into common area that can be seen 
both financial control and risk management department in excel file format and the 
daily data is taken into databases.  
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Eurobond positions of the bank come from the Euro or USD bonds issued by Turkish 
Government. The Eurobonds are typically sold to investors that are located the 
outside of the Turkey and the bonds can be sold to Turkish or foreign investors by 
their original investors. Therefore this kind of trading can only be performed via 
trading platforms such as Reuters or Bloomberg. For this reason the Eurobond data 
are taken directly from Reuters to shared workbook and then databases take 
Eurobond data from this workbook. 
The daily foreign exchange transactions reveal a representative foreign exchange rate 
for every currency pair. The Central Bank of Turkey takes five samples from the 
market each day and makes weighted average calculations on the data and sets end of 
the day foreign exchange rate for every different currency. The data present in 
Reuters servers, and that data is directly taken from the Reuters servers to excel 
workbook and then sent to databases.  
8.2 Yield Curve Formation 
Yield curve formation is another important part of the risk management system and 
there are several ways present in order to obtain accurate yield curve.  
 Nelson Siegel 
 Smoothed Nelson Siegel 
 Extended Nelson Siegel 
 Svennson  
 OLS Loglineer Discount 
 OLS Loglineer Coupon 
 OLS Echols & Eliot 
 Bootstrapping 
 Smoothed Bootstrapping 
 Interpolation 
o Linear 
o Logarithmic 
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o Cubic 
o Quadratic 
o Cubic Spline 
Most practical way of yield curve formation is linear approximation. In order to 
make linear approximation, data fed to database system is directly modified by SQL 
queries.  
The queries basically makes following modifications on the market data provided by 
Reuters software. At the first step the old data is updated by the fresh daily data (The 
data of last workday) and then another query modifies the data in which process all 
of the remaining queries can understand data. At the last step the data which contains 
yields of every New .Turkish Lira Bond is separated according to remaining days to 
maturity. Here the main idea is finding a suitable yield for every time bucket. The 
yield of corresponding maturity bucket simply calculated by taking weighted average 
of bonds that are present in this bucket. 
After formation of yield curve the other risk factors which are not sensitive to 
interest rate changes are added to main data. The result is ready for standard 
deviation and correlation calculations.  
8.3 Correlation and standard deviation calculation 
Every VaR model has to estimate volatility of the risk factors that are included in the 
model. Since every portfolio has typically more than one risk factor, determination of 
variance-covariance matrix and correlation matrix are essential and as the number of 
risk factors involved in the VaR calculation becomes higher the process becomes 
harder.  
In the literature there are many different methods present in order to calculate current 
volatility of the risk factors. Initially VaR models used constant volatility calculation 
models in order to estimate current volatility. However many historical evidence 
have revealed that this type of calculation is not suitable since volatility is not 
constant over time, therefore additional methods should be incorporated in order to 
achieve correct volatility estimation.  
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In order to catch up sudden changes in risk factor volatilities many different 
approaches have been developed in the literature. Some examples of fast volatility 
updating models are stated below: 
1. Uniform exponential weighting Models (First developed by JP Morgan) 
2. Asset-specific exponential weighting volatility model (First developed by 
Lawrance and Robinson) 
3. ARCH models (First developed by Engle) 
4. GARCH models (First developed by Bollershev) 
 All of the methods have their own advantages and disadvantages. If we consider 
advantages and disadvantages of the models we can say that exponentially weighted 
moving average or shortly EWMA model is relatively easy and cheap to implement 
and it supplies good estimates if correct EWMA coefficient is used. 
According to EWMA model standard deviation of a given sample can be calculated 
as follows: 
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Here wi is the corresponding weight given to the xi th observation.  
Calculation of correlation and standard deviations is vital part of VaR calculation 
because VaR can be defined as a multiple of standard deviation. In order to calculate 
standard deviations and correlations an excel file with customized standard deviation 
formula is created. The file contains a macro which is responsible for importing data 
from access databases and makes calculations on the data via embedded formulas. 
8.4 Portfolio Formation 
In order to see bank’s actual positions the trading portfolio has been divided into 
desks. The desk approach is a well-known approach in the financial literature since it 
supplies many advantages to bank. Firstly it gives easiness to follow positions of 
bank. Secondly it allows setting separate limits to bank’s positions. 
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Generally a bank portfolio may contain following desks: 
 Domestic Currency Bonds Desk 
 Foreign Currency Bonds Desk 
 Money Market Placements Desk 
 Foreign Exchange Desk 
 Option Book 
Typically banks make VaR calculations on daily basis. VaR figures are calculated on 
end of day portfolios and sent to treasury beginning of the day. Therefore, portfolio 
should be formed immediately start of the day, so risk management framework has to 
be formed fast enough to catch up speed of daily life.  
Principally Risk Management stuff have no financial knowledge, they are generally 
graduates of engineering or econometrics schools. Therefore they cannot assess 
correctness of data that they are using. For this reason Treasury Control Unit supplies 
daily data to Risk Management Unit. After formation of data Risk Management staff 
tries to map and strip cash flows of instruments. 
8.5 Mapping and Stripping 
Mapping and stripping is another important part of VaR calculation since it directly 
influences current value of the trading book. Every bond has unique characteristics 
and has different cash flows than others. Unfortunately, every bond can’t have exact 
vertix hit. Vertix can be defined as a point on time which has known interest rate. In 
order to calculate actual value of the portfolio every bond’s cash flow has to be 
divided into at least two components (Vertices) which have known interest rates.  
This process is very hard to implement. To solve the problem generally visual basic 
based macros are used. The process can be done in 3 steps using a visual basic coded 
macro (See Appendix A).  
In first step, a subroutine is written in order to determine cash flows of bonds. This 
subroutine decomposes bond transactions into their individual cash flows. The 
process is done in several steps: 
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In fist step transaction data is loaded from the input sheet. In the second step the type 
of underlying security is determined and decomposed the security into its cash flows. 
This is straightforward for discount or zero coupon bonds where the only cash flow 
is the principal. For fixed coupon bonds, the procedure simply loops over all 
remaining cash flows starting from the maturity date. For floating bonds, the macro 
decomposes them into the next coupon, known present value at the next reset date 
and a stream of excess coupons (annuity). 
In second step, two vertices at which bond’s cash flow can be divided is found. At 
the same time, standard deviations for the two vertices and their correlations are 
retrieved. The code uses two nested loops to figure out the bracketing bins. The outer 
loop runs over all cells in the Cash Flow Range. The inner loop runs over all vertices. 
Using this structure each cash flow is compared to every maturity bin. The inner loop 
does the followings: 
Make sure that the cash flow currency and vertix currency match. Test for exact 
vertix maturity in this case bin1 and bin2 are the same. Find the two bracketing 
vertices.  
In the last step cash flow of the each bond is split into its sub cash flows using 
another macro. The procedure splits the bond’s cash flow between the two previously 
identified vertices and a cash flow at time 0. The split is setup to preserve duration, 
variance and present value. The code considers the following three cases. 
1. Exact Vertix hit 
- The cash flow is split equally between the two vertices 
2. Degenerate case (sigma1 = sigma2 and correlation = 100%) 
- In this case, standard deviation is preserved 
- Regardless of the split. The function then does the split in such a way so as to have 
no CF at time 0. 
3. Normal Case 
- The split is done to preserve duration and variance 
- Cash flow at time 0 is then added to adjust the present value 
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This procedure is repeated for every type of instrument that is used by bank and their 
cash flows are aggregated according to their vertices.  
As said before mapping process is an important step of VaR calculation, since it 
directly influences present value of the portfolio. The approach which is stated above 
guarantees the correct calculation of portfolio present value. Therefore VaR 
calculation becomes easy to handle. After mapping, the data is ready for VaR 
calculation. 
8.6 Parametric Value at Risk Calculation 
Parametric VaR has become the sectoral standard way to calculate Value-at-Risk. It's 
fast, simple to understand, and often fairly accurate. It also has a number of side 
benefits such as providing the correlations between different groupings of 
instruments and allowing for great flexibility.  
In calculation step mapped cash flows are entered to input sheet and their present 
values are calculated in the next sheets. The calculated risk factors are entered in 
another sheet and covariance matrix of risk factors is developed according to EWMA 
methodology. After employment of necessary calculations parametric VaR can been 
calculated via following formula. 
 
 
Here VaR Multiplier is confidence level parameter. If we use 99% confidence level 
the multiplier becomes 2.33. 
The Risk Management Team has decided to implement parametric VaR 
methodology since it is comparatively cheap and fast to implement and very easy to 
understand for someone who does not familiar with VaR methodology. 
8.7 Kurtosis Adjustment (Normal Mixture) 
General VaR models assume that, risk factors have normal distributions. However in 
real life it can be realized that the factors do not follow normal distributions patterns 
during the crisis. Turkey is generally accepted as a developing country and generally 
it is very sensitive to global fluctuations and domestic political situations. Therefore, 
(8.2) VectorWeightMatrixianceCoVectorWeightMultiplierVaRVaR Ttotal ×××= var
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banks have to find alternative ways to model kurtosis of the market data, since the 
market data has fat tails. 
One of the most common ways of modeling tail of a given market data is normal 
mixture. Normal mixture can be defined as a mixture of two scenarios one of the 
scenarios is called “Disaster Scenario” while the other one represent current 
situation. 
First step in calculating normal mixture is selection of “Disaster Scenario”. Turkey 
has many financial crises during last years; some of them are 2001, 2003 and 2006 
crisis. First two are coming from internal problems while the other came from global 
fluctuations.  In order to represent Turkey’s situation 2003 scenario is considered as 
“Disaster Scenario”.  
Second step is determining weight of the “Disaster Scenario”. Weight is determined 
by subjective judgment. Determination of weight is directly depends on Risk 
managers experience, top management’s risk appetite and current situation’s 
volatility level. 
In the third step Normal Mixture factor is calculated. The calculation procedure can 
be seen below: 
 Covariance matrices of each scenario should be calculated. Here the 
calculation is straight forward historical data of each risk factor is available and 
covariance matrices can be calculated via 1-year historical data. 
 Weight vector of portfolio should be formed. In the mapping step portfolio’s 
cash flows has been divided into sub cash flows with known yield to maturity.  
 VaR of the portfolio should be calculated with using each matrix. Here the 
calculation formula is:  
 
 
Here we have two different VaR values the first one come from current data and the 
other one come from “Disaster Scenario”.  
 After calculation of VaR via two scenarios yearly volatility of portfolio should be 
calculated. Volatility of portfolio can be find via following formula: 
VectorWeightMatrixianceCoVectorWeightMultiplierVaRVaR Ttotal ×××= var
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 After calculation of individual volatilities mixture of them should be 
calculated. Mixture volatility is simple weighted sum of individual volatilities. 
 After that the following equation should be set to zero. This process is done 
with an optimization algorithm 
 
 
 
.Here p is weight of the current scenario and Normsdist is a spreadsheet function 
which returns the normal cumulative distribution for the specified mean and standard 
deviation. NM Unit VaR is VaR of mixture with PV=1 
 After calculation of unit VaR. Annual VaR of the mixture portfolio can be 
found by simply multiplication of weight vector with NM unit VaR.  
 In the next step daily mixture VaR is calculated via following formula: 
 
PeriodHoldingFactorScaling
VaRAnnualNM
×
 
 
 Lastly Normal Mixture Factor is calculated by formula stated below: 
 
 
 
Calculation of NM factor allows us to assess risk level of the portfolio and it can be 
seen as scaling factor of parametric VaR. As a result NM adjusted parametric VaR 
equals to parametric VaR times NM factor. 
8.8 Limit Setting 
Limit setting is another important aspect of risk management framework. Generally 
management board sets yearly loss limit to treasury department. After that risk 
management department tries to give daily loss limits to treasury department on desk 
)()( PeriodHoldingsqrtFactorScalingVectorWeightMultiplierVaR
VaR
P ××
×
=σ
01.0)()1()( −−−+−×
VolatilityAnnualStress
VaRUnitNMNormsdistp
VolatilityAnnualCurrent
VaRUnitNMNormsdistp
VaRCurrent
VaRDailyNM
(8.3) 
(8.4) 
(8.5) 
(8.6) 
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and consolidated basis. According to banking regulations of Turkey foreign 
exchange exposures are subject to legal limits while interest rate based instruments 
are not. Therefore treasury department needs to know their fixed income and foreign 
exchange limits separately.  
These limits are set according to economic capital allocated to treasury activities. 
First, economic capital allocated to trading activity is converted to daily potential 
loss limit via following formula:  
 
 
 
After that this daily limit is divided into desk limits meaning foreign exchange desk 
and fixed income desk. In order to guarantee not violating legal foreign exchange 
limits all of the foreign exchange positions are fixed their own caps and remaining 
limit is allocated to fixed income desk. The limit breakdown can be seen below.  
 
 
Figure 8.1 Limit Breakdown 
Therefore we can say that when trading limit is fully used, bank has stable foreign 
exchange position and carry floating interest rate risk. 
Additionally, risk management departments have to supply necessary information, 
data and know-how to bank’s other departments. In this perspective risk management 
department supplies risk coefficients for bonds that are used by treasury. The risk 
coefficients basically say following if you purchase 1 million nominal from this bond 
your potential loss increases approximately this amount. Limit and their usages and 
risk coefficients to treasury management to monitor its usage.  
Economic Capital 
FX Desk Limit Fixed Income Limit 
Total Daily VaR 
FX Position (Net) FX/FX Position TL Bonds Limit FX Bonds Limit 
PeriodHoldingFactorScaling
CapitalEconomicLimitVaRDaily
×
=
(8.7) 
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8.9 Other Aspects 
Risk management framework contains some other aspects according to bank’s needs 
and the board’s management perspectives. Some of the aspects concerns with legal 
issues of risk management department while the others done according to MIS 
principles. 
Risk management departments prepare and report legal weekly currency position 
reports to BRSA and prepares monthly market risk reports on sole and quarterly on 
consolidated base.  
Risk management frameworks have to deal with option portfolio of the bank and 
structured products sold or bought by treasury management as well. Principally an 
option may be done on many different underlying. In Turkey most of the options are 
made on foreign currencies. Typically an option gives a right to its owner to buy or 
sell a predetermined amount of foreign currency at predetermined price on agreed 
day. Options have many different types such as European or American types 
according to their exercise styles and barrier or vanilla according to its structure. 
A vanilla European option gives a right to its owner to buy or sell a predetermined 
amount of foreign currency at predetermined price on agreed day. These types of 
options are easiest option type to model and they typically priced with Black and 
Scholes option pricing model. In this type option, option owner have to wait until 
exercise date of the option and at this date he/she decides to use its right or not. 
Other types of options are priced with Monte Carlo simulation models and the 
models should be designed according to options unique characteristics. Another type 
of option is vanilla American option which gives a right to its owner to buy or sell a 
predetermined amount of foreign currency at predetermined price until agreed day. 
Other structured options contain some barriers which stand for activation or 
deactivation levels of options.  
Risk management system has to supply option portfolio’s greeks to financial control, 
treasury control and treasury management departments on daily basis. Moreover 
option Delta’s directly added to bank’s foreign exchange desk position in order to 
reflect actual position of the bank. 
 121 
Risk management framework has to back-up its daily calculations and prepare 
monthly reports on them. Therefore a spread sheet has to be developed in order to 
monitor and collect limits and limit usages of treasury management.  
Model’s performance has to be monitored according to bactesting regulations. 
Therefore a rigid policy has to be employed to monitor model’s daily accurateness. A 
spread sheet has been developed in order to compare daily predicted loss with actual 
profit and loss. The figure below represents model’s bactesting results from 
beginning of the year 2006. The figure below shows that the model has 4 exceptional 
days in the last 23 months (The exceptional days fall below the VaR line). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Backtesting Results 
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9. CONCLUSION  
Risk management systems gained importance since 2001 financial crisis. Risk 
management systems have to be implemented according to BRSA requirements. 
Currently every bank in Turkey has to use standardized approach in measuring 
market risk. However with BASLE II, bank’s can use their own models in 
calculating their market risks if BRSA accepts.  
As a regulation capital adequacy ratio of a bank should be greater than or equal to 
12% and capital adequacy ratio can be expressed via following formula: 
 
 
 
As can be seen in formula, market risk capital should be lowest level. Market Risk 
capital can be calculated via following: 
 
PeriodHoldingFactorScalingVaRCapitalRiskMarket Portfolio ××=   
 
When we examine the formula we see that we have to minimize scaling factor and 
VaR of the portfolio if we want to minimize legal market risk capital. The 
backtesting results of the model say the model has no exceptional days during the 
last year; therefore model scaling factor is 3. According to model results VaR of the 
portfolio is equal to 525 776 YTL as at the end of September 2007 if we calculate 
market risk capital it is equal to: 4 990 000 YTL. This number is calculated 
economical capital according to internal model’s approach. The standardized 
approach requires approximately 60 000 000 YTL market risk capital at the end of 
September 2007 which is 15 times larger than internal models approach.  
This model’s success directly influences profitability of the bank because it is 
requires less amount of capital in order to sustain banking activities of the bank. 
When we examine backtesting results of the model we can conclude that 
standardized approach over estimate market risk of bank. 
CapitalRisklOperationaCapitalRiskCreditCapitalRiskMarket
CapitalRatioAdequacyCapital
++
= (9.1) 
(9.2) 
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For future work the bank have to prepare a paper regarding its models performance 
to BRSA and try to get permission to use its internal model in Market Risk 
calculations. 
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APPENDIX A 
The macros given below find vertices and corresponding cash flows to the vertices of 
a given cash flow.  
 
Sub VertixIdentifier(CashFlowRange As Range) 
Rem This function identifies which two vertices bracket a given cashflow 
Rem At the same time, standard deviations for the two vertices 
Rem and their correlation is retrieved. 
Rem  The code uses two nested loops to figure out the bracketing bins. 
Rem  The outer loop runs over all cells in the CashFlowRange. 
Rem  The inner loop runs over all vertices. Using this structure 
Rem  each cashflow is compared to every maturity bin. 
Rem  The inner loop does the following 
Rem  1. Make sure that the cashflow currency and vertix currency match 
Rem  2. Test for exact vertix maturity 
Rem          - in this case bin1 and bin2 are the same 
Rem  3. Find the two bracketing vertices 
Rem  Please note that this code relies on the fact that 
Rem  risk factor vertices are ordered in the order of increasing 
Rem  maturity in the Vertix Range. 
 
Dim ac As Range 
Dim Vertix As Range 
Dim Key As String 
Dim NumberOfRows As Integer 
 
'Test for non-existing instruments 
If IsEmpty(CashFlowRange.Cells(1, 1)) = False Then 'a 
 
NumberOfRows = CashFlowRange.Rows.Count 
     
Rem Update StatusBar and Turn-off 
Application.ScreenUpdating = False 
Application.Calculation = xlCalculationManual 
 
'Begin Main Loop Over All CashFlows 
For Each ac In CashFlowRange 
   Application.StatusBar = "Identifying Vertices, Row Number: " _ 
        & ac.Row & "/" & NumberOfRows 
    With ac 
       'For Each CashFlow, loop over all vertices 
        For Each Vertix In Range("VerticesRange") 
          'Match Currency 
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          If .Offset(0, -1).Value > 10950 Then 
          .Offset(0, -1).Value = 10950 
            Else 
          If .Offset(0, -2).Text = Vertix.Offset(0, -2).Text Then 
          'Test for Exact Vertix Maturity 
            If .Offset(0, -1).Value = Vertix.Offset(0, -1).Value Then 
             .Offset(0, 1) = Vertix 
             .Offset(0, 2) = Vertix 
             .Offset(0, 3) = Vertix.Offset(0, 1) 
             .Offset(0, 4) = Vertix.Offset(0, 1) 
             .Offset(0, 5) = Vertix.Offset(0, 2) 
             .Offset(0, 6) = Vertix.Offset(0, 2) 
            Else 
                'Find the two bracketing cashflows 
                If .Offset(0, -1).Value > Vertix.Offset(0, -1).Value And _ 
                    .Offset(0, -1).Value < Vertix.Offset(1, -1).Value Then 
                    .Offset(0, 1) = Vertix 
                    .Offset(0, 2) = Vertix.Offset(1, 0) 
                    .Offset(0, 3) = Vertix.Offset(0, 1) 
                    .Offset(0, 4) = Vertix.Offset(1, 1) 
                    .Offset(0, 5) = Vertix.Offset(0, 2) 
                    .Offset(0, 6) = Vertix.Offset(1, 2) 
                End If 
            End If 
          End If 
          End If 
       Next Vertix 
    End With 
    
   'Lookup Correlation 
   If (ac.Offset(0, 1).Text <> "") And (ac.Offset(0, 1).Text <> "") Then 
       Key = ac.Offset(0, 1).Text & ac.Offset(0, 2).Text 
       ac.Offset(0, 7).Value = _ 
          Application.WorksheetFunction.VLookup(Key, Range("CorrelationRange"), 
2, False) 
   End If 
Next ac 
 
End If 'a 
 
Rem ReturnControl to MS Excel 
Application.ScreenUpdating = True 
Application.StatusBar = False 
Application.Calculation = xlCalculationAutomatic 
 
End Sub 
Sub CashFlowSplitter(CashFlowRange As Range) 
Rem This procedure splits the cashflow between the two previously 
Rem identified vertices and a cashflow at time 0. The split is setup 
Rem to preserve duration, variance and present value. 
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Rem The code considers the following three cases. 
Rem 1. Exact Vertix hit 
Rem         - the cashflow is split equally between the two vertices 
Rem 2. Degenerate case(sigma1 = sigma2 and correlation = 100%) 
Rem         - in this case, standard deviation is preserved 
Rem         - regardless of the split. The function then does 
Rem         - the split in such a way so as to have no CF at time 0. 
Rem 3. Normal Case 
Rem         - the split is done to preserve duration and variance 
Rem         - cash flow at time 0 is then added to adjust the present value 
 
Dim ac As Range 
Dim WeightOfVertix1 As Double 
Dim WeightOfVertix2 As Double 
Dim Vertix1DTM As Double 
Dim Vertix2DTM As Double 
Dim Rate As Double 
Dim Duration As Double 
Dim Duration1 As Double 
Dim Duration2 As Double 
Dim PresentValue As Double 
Dim QuadraticCoefficient As Double 
Dim LinearCoefficient As Double 
Dim Intercept As Double 
Dim Sigma1 As Double 
Dim Sigma2 As Double 
Dim Sigma As Double 
Dim Rho12 As Double 
Dim SplitFactor As Double 
Dim Root1 As Double 
Dim Root2 As Double 
Dim Root As Double 
Dim PresentValue1 As Double 
Dim PresentValue2 As Double 
Dim SplitPV1 As Double 
Dim SplitPV2 As Double 
Dim SplitDuration1 As Double 
Dim SplitDuration2 As Double 
Dim NumberOfRows As Integer 
Dim VolatilitySlope As String 
 
'Test for non-existing instruments 
If IsEmpty(CashFlowRange.Cells(1, 1)) = False Then 'a 
 
NumberOfRows = CashFlowRange.Rows.Count 
     
Rem Turn-off screen updating 
Application.ScreenUpdating = False 
 
'Begin Main loop 
 129 
For Each ac In CashFlowRange 
     
  'Update the StatusBar 
  Application.StatusBar = "Performing the Split, Row Number" _ 
        & ac.Row & "/" & NumberOfRows 
  With ac 
   'Load in Parameters 
   Sigma1 = .Offset(0, 5).Value 
   Sigma2 = .Offset(0, 6).Value 
   Rho12 = .Offset(0, 7).Value 
   Vertix1DTM = Val(Mid(.Offset(0, 1).Text, 4, Len(.Offset(0, 1).Text) - 3)) 
   Vertix2DTM = Val(Mid(.Offset(0, 2).Text, 4, Len(.Offset(0, 2).Text) - 3)) 
 
   If Vertix1DTM = Vertix2DTM Then 'Output Results for Exact Vertix Hit 
      SplitFactor = (1# / 2#) 
      .Offset(0, 8) = SplitFactor * .Value 
      .Offset(0, 9) = (1 - SplitFactor) * .Value 
      .Offset(0, 10) = 0 
      Rate = .Offset(0, 3) 
      PresentValue = .Value * Exp(-Rate * .Offset(0, -1) / 365#) 
      Duration = -.Value * (.Offset(0, -1) / 365#) * Exp(-Rate * (.Offset(0, -1) / 365#)) 
   Else 
      'Calculate Interpolated Yield and PV Between Vertices 
      WeightOfVertix2 = (.Offset(0, -1).Value - Vertix1DTM) / (Vertix2DTM - 
Vertix1DTM) 
      WeightOfVertix1 = (Vertix2DTM - .Offset(0, -1).Value) / (Vertix2DTM - 
Vertix1DTM) 
      Rate = WeightOfVertix1 * .Offset(0, 3).Value + _ 
                 WeightOfVertix2 * .Offset(0, 4).Value 
      Sigma = WeightOfVertix1 * Sigma1 + WeightOfVertix2 * Sigma2 
    
      'Assume Continuous Compounding For CashFlow Discounting 
      PresentValue = .Value * Exp(-Rate * .Offset(0, -1) / 365#) 
      Duration = -.Value * (.Offset(0, -1) / 365#) * _ 
      Exp(-Rate * (.Offset(0, -1) / 365#)) 
 
   If (Sigma1 = Sigma2) And (Rho12 = 1) Then 'Test for a degenerate case 
      SplitFactor = _ 
      (((Vertix1DTM * Vertix2DTM / 365#) * PresentValue / Duration) + 
Vertix1DTM) / _ 
            (Vertix1DTM - Vertix2DTM) 
   Else 
      'Calculate Two Quadratic Roots 
      QuadraticCoefficient = Sigma1 * Sigma1 + Sigma2 * Sigma2 - 2 * Rho12 * 
Sigma1 * Sigma2 
      LinearCoefficient = 2 * Rho12 * Sigma1 * Sigma2 - 2 * Sigma2 * Sigma2 
      Intercept = Sigma2 * Sigma2 - Sigma * Sigma 
      Root1 = QuadraticRoot(QuadraticCoefficient, LinearCoefficient, Intercept, True) 
      Root2 = QuadraticRoot(QuadraticCoefficient, LinearCoefficient, Intercept, 
False) 
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      'Volatility Term Structure Shape 
      If Sigma1 > Sigma2 Then 
        VolatilitySlope = "downward" 
      Else 
        VolatilitySlope = "upward" 
      End If 
         
      'Select Meaningful Root 
      If Root1 > 1 Then 
            SplitFactor = Root2 
      End If 
      If (Root2 < 0) Then 
            If VolatilitySlope = "upward" Then 
            SplitFactor = Root1 
            End If 
            If Abs(Root2) > 1 Then 
                SplitFactor = Root1 
                 
            Else 
            SplitFactor = -Root2 
            End If 
      End If 
   End If 
    
   Duration1 = SplitFactor * Duration 
   Duration2 = (1 - SplitFactor) * Duration 
    
   .Offset(0, 8) = -Duration1 * _ 
      Exp(.Offset(0, 3).Value * Vertix1DTM / 365#) * 365# / Vertix1DTM 
   .Offset(0, 9) = -Duration2 * _ 
      Exp(.Offset(0, 4).Value * Vertix2DTM / 365#) * 365# / Vertix2DTM 
   PresentValue1 = .Offset(0, 8) * Exp(-.Offset(0, 3).Value * Vertix1DTM / 365) 
   PresentValue2 = .Offset(0, 9) * Exp(-.Offset(0, 4).Value * Vertix2DTM / 365) 
   .Offset(0, 10) = PresentValue - PresentValue1 - PresentValue2 
 
 End If 
    
  Rem Output Diagnostics 
   .Offset(0, 11) = PresentValue 
      SplitPV1 = .Offset(0, 8) * Exp(-.Offset(0, 3).Value * Vertix1DTM / 365) 
      SplitPV2 = .Offset(0, 9) * Exp(-.Offset(0, 4).Value * Vertix2DTM / 365) 
   .Offset(0, 12) = SplitPV1 + SplitPV2 + .Offset(0, 10) 
   .Offset(0, 13) = Duration 
      SplitDuration1 = -.Offset(0, 8) * (Vertix1DTM / 365) * _ 
            Exp(-.Offset(0, 3).Value * Vertix1DTM / 365) 
      SplitDuration2 = -.Offset(0, 9) * (Vertix2DTM / 365) * _ 
            Exp(-.Offset(0, 4).Value * Vertix2DTM / 365) 
   .Offset(0, 14) = SplitDuration1 + SplitDuration2 
   .Offset(0, 15).Formula = "=" & .Offset(0, 11).Address(False, False) & "-" & _ 
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      .Offset(0, 12).Address(False, False) 
   .Offset(0, 16).Formula = "=" & .Offset(0, 13).Address(False, False) & "-" & _ 
      .Offset(0, 14).Address(False, False) 
   .Offset(0, 17) = SplitFactor 
   .Offset(0, 18) = Rate 
   .Offset(0, 19) = Sigma 
  End With 
Next ac 
 
End If 'a 
 
Rem Turn-on screen updating 
Application.ScreenUpdating = True 
Application.StatusBar = False 
End Sub 
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